

Date : 10/15/97
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10104
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1962
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 3360 (7 FEB 62)

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : NORTHWOODS
DATE : 00/00/62
PAGES : 197
SUBJECTS : U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA

OPERATION MONGOOSE

UPRISINGS IN CUBA

COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA

SOVIET BASE IN CUBA

CARIBBEAN SECURITY

PATROL POSTS

INVASION OF CUBA

JUSTIFICATION FOR U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1962, Box 29. JCS Record Case, Code Name Northwoods, containing JCS Papers related to JCS recommendation to invade Cuba and pretexts to justify US military intervention.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10104
RECORD SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1962
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 3360 (7 FEB 62)

October 20, 1997

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 0

Number of Postponements: 5

Postponement # 1 (Page DJSM-909-62, 25 July 1962, pg 2):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Operational Details

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 2 (Page JCS 1969/347, 2 May 1962, pp 1-9): ⁸ *DA*

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Operational Details

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 3 (Page JCS 1969/347, Maritime Support, Operation Mongoose, 8 May 1962, pg 1):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.

**NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION**

MAR 2016

DATE: _____

Substitute Language: Operational Details

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 4 (Page JCS 1969/389, 23 July 1962, pp 14-15):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Operational Details

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 5 (Page OP605F/br, Ser 000374P60, 24 April 1962, pp 2-4):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Operational Details

Release Date: 10/2017

Board Review Completed: 10/14/97

★ Paperclip

202-10002-10/04

Declassification Review/Postponement Form

Originator: JCS / NORTHWOODS 3360 (7 FEB 62)
Date: Multi CASE NO.

Subject: Mongoose & Cuba

Original Level of Classification: TS

Third Agency Equities: CIA OSD [initials] JCS [initials] [initials]

Remarks: Review only Mongoose material & Mongoose related
"Berlin" documents not responsive

Page # of Postponement

Reason for Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act

OSD: NO OBJECTIONS

**CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT**

Brackets
EXEMPTED FROM DECLASSIFICATION
BY JOINT STAFF AT TABS
EXEMPTION: G (1)(C)
DATE: OCT 07 1997

The Department of State has no objection to the
release or declassification of this document in full
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)
Reviewed on 10/9/97 mya

**NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**
10-8-97 lms

DECLASSIFIED BY USIA-GC/D
MONTH 8 DAY 6 YEAR 97
AUTHORITY: JFK Act

No objection to release

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

DECLASSIFICATION UNIT



NORTHWOODS
(JCS CASE NO.
3360,
7 Feb 62)

THIS AGENCY HAS DECLASSIFIED ALL OF
USIA'S HOLDING IN THIS DOCUMENT IN
COMPLIANCE WITH
THE JFK ACT

DECLASSIFIED BY USIA-GC/D
MONTH 8 DAY 6 YEAR 97
AUTHORITY: JFK Act
No objection to release.



THE JOINT STAFF

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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SPECIAL HANDLING

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON *21 July 62*
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

DJSM-909-62
25 July 1962

*Filed
Wed 25*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: US Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)

1. I have reviewed subject paper (JCS 1969/389) and recommend that the following changes be made in order to take full cognizance of the possible requirement for reducing military reaction time to less than eighteen (18) days.

2. Page 12, paragraph 3a(3), change to read as follows:

"(3) US Military Reaction

(a) With no prior warning . . . result in minimum US and Cuban casualties. ~~if there is a requirement . . . delete remainder of paragraph through (d)-Weather-(to-a limited-extent)-~~

(b) A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period would necessitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be assembled and employed. The time required to gain essential US military control may be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. In such case, an airborne assault could be initiated in five (5) days followed by air-landed units as soon as airfields are

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SPECIAL HANDLING

secured. Navy/Marine amphibious forces could be committed within eight (8) days; follow on forces would be committed as they become available. Incremental commitment of forces increased the risk of heavier casualties on both sides.

(c) The Cuban situation could demand more immediate reaction than employment of airborne/amphibious forces can provide, possibly to forestall drastic reprisal actions by the Communist Cuban Government. US military plans will provide for a rapid commitment of air power, naval gunfire and initiation of a blockade prior to the airborne/amphibious assault."

3. To be consistent with changes recommended above, page 14, paragraph 3b(3) should be changed in the first two sentences as follows:

"(3) [REDACTED]

1C

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HERBERT D. RILEY
Vice Admiral, USN
Director

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WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

1969/389
TOP SECRET-NOFORN
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SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON *21 May 84*
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

DJSM-909-62
25 July 1962

*Filed
Wed 25 Jul*

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3. To be consistent with changes recommended above, page 14, paragraph 3b(3) should be changed in the first two sentences as follows:

"(3) In concept, initial military operations commence with a sea-and-air blockade, ~~On D-day a period of concentrated air strikes and coordinated Naval gunfire to will effect destruction of enemy air power and to neutralize neutralization and destroy destruction as much as possible of the enemy tank, armor, artillery, and anti-air capability. as-much-as-possible.~~ The initial air strikes . . .

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HENRY D. RILEY
Vice Admiral, USN
Director

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 1969/347

2 May 1962

Page 2213

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on
NORTHWOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. ELIOT

M. J. ENGELDO

Joint Secretariat

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JCS 1969/347

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within harbors to put these PT's out of action are risky in that there is a probability that agents/swimmers would be captured with subsequent exposure and US complicity. After the PT's commence to operate, their pattern of operations will be studied so as to establish methods to dispose of them outside of their harbors. A wider spectrum of actions with less risk should become practical after their pattern of operations is established.

4. Possible covert/ clandestine ways and means of putting Cuban PT craft out of action include the following:

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[REDACTED]

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Appendix to Enclosure

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

5. Although the Navy has ways and means available to destroy or neutralize the Cuban PT boats, none can be covertly executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more information is obtained on the degree of their security protection. Under conditions of covert warfare, the Navy can quickly dispose of the Cuban PT's. The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT's and will recommend appropriate means to dispose of them when an opportunity is presented.

/s/ George W. Anderson
GEORGE W. ANDERSON

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Appendix to Enclosure

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In reply refer to
OP605P/br
Ser 000374P60

April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Maritime Support, Operation MONGOOSE (TS)

References: a. CM 610-62 of 16 Mar 1962
b. CNO memo for the JCS Ser 000314P60
of 20 Mar 1962

1. Reference a requested the Chief of Naval Operations to provide specified information on PT type craft, maritime support needs, and ways of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of action. Reference b provided certain data on PT craft and specified maritime support.
2. The Cuban PT's are fast (up to 45 knots), highly maneuverable, and possess a credible armament consisting of 4-25 mm (twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo tubes (two torpedoes) and from 12-16 depth charges. In overt conventional naval war operations these boats would be put out of action quickly, although an anti-PT defense would have to be established to protect our troop/cargo carrying ships until the PT's were eliminated. The primary means of destroying PT craft would be aircraft delivered rocket/gunfire and surface ship gunfire.
3. There have been no reports on the operations of the Cuban PT's. They have been delivered by Soviet ships to Havana, offloaded and sailed under their own power to Mariel. Eight boats are presently located at Mariel. Four PT's, delivered in early April, were still in Havana at last report, but are expected to move to Mariel in the near future. The only way to put these boats out of action while they are in port is by means of agents or swimmer (UIT type) sabotage. Operations

within harbors to put these PT's out of action are risky in that there is a probability that agents/swimmers would be captured with subsequent exposure and US complicity. After the PT's commence to operate, their pattern of operations will be studied so as to establish methods to dispose of them outside of their harbors. A wider spectrum of actions with less risk should become practical after their pattern of operations is established.

4. Possible covert/ clandestine ways and means of putting Cuban PT craft out of action include the following:

a. Fuel contamination. Fuel contamination could be accomplished either by inserting foreign material (chemicals) directly into the craft's fuel system or the fuel supply ashore (POL). Delivery of the contaminant would be by agent or swimmer. Resultant damage would be temporary mechanical. Risk of detection would be high, results would be minimal in comparison.

b. Limpet mines/demolition charges. Underwater swimmers, launched from submarines under cover of darkness could penetrate the PT base and attach limpet mines to the underwater body of the craft. Agents could install demolition charges in the boats at their piers. Damage resulting from limpets/demolition charges would be major resulting in destruction and/or sinking of the boat. Risk of detection in operations of this type against Havana or Mariel would be high. PT berths in both harbors are in secure areas making agent delivery very difficult. Both harbors are landlocked with narrow entrances from the sea. The PT's are moored at piers well inside the harbor and not on a direct line from the entrance. The entrances are guarded by continuously manned machine gun posts on both sides of the entrance. Boats are known to patrol during the day, no information is available on night boat patrol activity. The

currents in the entrances are swift. This would possibly require a swimmer to penetrate on a flood tide and remain inside the harbor until the ebb tide before he would be able to effect his escape. Under these conditions, the risk of swimmer detection through accident (equipment malfunction or similar difficulty) would be higher than the benefits to be realized by such operations.

c. Logistic sabotage. Sabotage of any portion of the spare parts supply system would minimize operational availability of the boats. Agents would be required to perform the sabotage. Insufficient information is available on the logistic supply system to evaluate the risks involved.

d. Floating debris. Placing floating debris (logs, fishing nets, etc.) in PT operating areas would create an operational hazard. If a PT struck a solid object, the resultant damage would range from minor hull damage to destruction depending on the speed and angle at which the object was struck. Fishing nets, rope and similar material would foul the screws and temporarily disable the boat. Operations of this type would have to be carefully executed to insure that the hazard was localized in the PT area to avoid danger to innocent shipping. While not feasible at present since the PT's have not commenced operations, it may be practicable at a later time.

e. Lures. Floating devices with explosive charges could be made into attractive lures by bright paint, emission of spurious signals (radio/noise) or given other distinguishing characteristics which would engender curiosity or demand investigation. These devices could be fuzed to explode in a number of ways (remote control, contact or by handling). The devices would be planted in the PT operating areas after they become known. Extreme care would be required in the conduct of such operations to insure that innocent shipping

was not endangered. Damage resulting from detonation of the mine could extend up to permanent destruction of the boat.

f. Deception. When the operational pattern is developed for the PT's, it might be possible to conduct deception operations that would result in their destruction. Drone targets, electronic/visual signals, changing positions of navigational aids or similar acts might be used to cause the PT's to run into shoal waters or onto a reef. This form of operation could also be used to divert the attention of patrolling PT's from other operations being conducted.

5. Although the Navy has ways and means available to destroy or neutralize the Cuban PT boats, none can be covertly executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more information is obtained on the degree of their security protection. Under conditions of overt warfare, the Navy can quickly dispose of the Cuban PT's. The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT's and will recommend appropriate means to dispose of them when an opportunity is presented.

/s/ George W. Anderson

GEORGE W. ANDERSON

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: JCS 1969/347 - Maritime Support,
Operation Mongoose (TS)

1. On 14 March 1962, the Secretary of Defense inquired whether there is some way of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban PT boats out of action.

2. The attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense forwards a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations, which sets forth some possible ways and means of putting the Cuban PT boats out of action, but states in substance that it is not practicable to carry out the operations at this time and that appropriate recommendations will be submitted at a later date.

3. Some possible ways of putting the Cuban PT boats out of action enumerated at [REDACTED]

4. The Operations Deputies approved the attached memo for the Secretary of Defense, together with its enclosure, on 7 May 1962 for transmittal to the Secretary of Defense. It is recommended that you approve and sign the attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, which forwards the CNO report.

William H. Craig
WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brig. General, USA
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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2. The attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense forwards a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations, which sets forth some possible ways and means of putting the Cuban PT boats out of action, but states in substance that it is not practicable to carry out the operations at this time and that appropriate recommendations will be submitted at a later date.
3. Some possible ways of putting the Cuban PT boats out of action enumerated are: fuel contamination, sabotage, and one or more of the following: limpet/demonstration charges, floating debris, lures and deception operations.
4. The Operations Deputies approved the attached memo for the Secretary of Defense, together with its enclosure, on 7 May 1962 for transmittal to the Secretary of Defense. It is recommended that you approve and sign the attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, which forwards the CNO report.

21 May 62
William H. Craig
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Brig. General, USA
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group

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JCS 1969/389

23 July 1962

Page 2324

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

M. J. INGELDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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JCS 1969/389

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REF ID: A66000

b. Department of Defense Operations.

(1) When directed by higher authority, or as the situation demands, the Department of Defense will initiate preparatory actions for US military intervention in Cuba. These actions may include pre-positioning forces and equipment by execution of current cover and deception plans.

(2) Upon final decision of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct execution of military intervention plans for Cuba.

(3) In concept, initial military operations commence with a blockade, concentrated air strikes and coordinated Naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy air power and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy tank, armor, artillery, and anti-air capability.

(a)

[REDACTED]

(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)

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REF ID: A66000

[REDACTED]

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(5) At such time as essential US military control is gained in Cuba, matters of civil affairs and military government will be given priority and undertaken in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. This includes provision for a provisional military government prepared to assume full legislative, executive, and judicial control until such functions can be turned over to other authority on direction in an expeditious and orderly manner. Remaining resistance elements of the Communist Cuban government, armed forces or other groups will be isolated, contained and destroyed or captured as rapidly as possible. US military combat units will be scheduled for early return to the United States consistent with security considerations.

c. Department of State Operations.

(1) Phase I. The Department of State will seek to place the United States in as broad a multilateral context as possible.

(a) Immediately sound out Latin American Governments to determine whether the United States can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing the use of military forces under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty.

b. Department of Defense Operations.

(1) When directed by higher authority, or as the situation demands, the Department of Defense will initiate preparatory actions for US military intervention in Cuba. These actions may include pre-positioning forces and equipment by execution of current cover and deception plans.

(2) Upon final decision of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct execution of military intervention plans for Cuba.

(3) In concept, initial military operations commence with a blockade, concentrated air strikes and coordinated Naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy air power and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy tank, armor, artillery, and anti-air capability.

(a) In western Cuba airborne and amphibious assaults will be conducted by a Joint Task Force with the initial objective of seizing the city of Havana and obtaining control over the seat of government. Army airborne units will secure the major airfields in the area as well as major port areas required for follow-on forces and logistic resupply. Navy/Marine amphibious forces will secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Havana and designated Army units will follow the Marines over the beach. The Marine amphibious forces will be prepared to re-embark for further operations as directed.

(b) In eastern Cuba, Guantanamo will be reinforced by air- and sea-lifted Marines for defense

(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)

of the base. Additional Navy/Marine amphibious forces will be employed in operations against Cuban forces in the Santiago de Cuba complex or in other operations in eastern Cuba as directed.

(4) Subsequent to the seizure of Havana and Santiago and the successful defense of Guantanamo, operations will be conducted to defeat remaining pockets of resistance. Additional amphibious and airborne operations may be required. The most likely areas for such operations are: Matanzas, Nuevitas, Nicaro, Trinidad, Bahia de Cochinos, and the Isle of Pines.

(5) At such time as essential US military control is gained in Cuba, matters of civil affairs and military government will be given priority and undertaken in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. This includes provision for a provisional military government prepared to assume full legislative, executive, and judicial control until such functions can be turned over to other authority on direction in an expeditious and orderly manner. Remaining resistance elements of the Communist Cuban government, armed forces or other groups will be isolated, contained and destroyed or captured as rapidly as possible. US military combat units will be scheduled for early return to the United States consistent with security considerations.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In reply refer to
OP605F/br
Ser 000374P60

24 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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4. Possible covert/clandestine ways and means of putting Cuban PT craft out of action include the following:

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GEORGE W. ANDERSON

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
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 currents in the entrances are swift. This would possibly require a swimmer to penetrate on a flood tide and remain inside the harbor until the ebb tide before he would be able to effect his escape. Under these conditions, the risk of swimmer detection through accident (equipment malfunction or similar difficulty) would be higher than the benefits to be realized by such operations.

c. Logistic sabotage. Sabotage of any portion of the spare parts supply system would minimize operational availability of the boats. Agents would be required to perform the sabotage. Insufficient information is available on the logistic supply system to evaluate the risks involved.

d. Floating debris. Placing floating debris (logs, fishing nets, etc.) in PT operating areas would create an operational hazard. If a PT struck a solid object, the resultant damage would range from minor hull damage to destruction depending on the speed and angle at which the object was struck. Fishing nets, rope and similar material would foul the screws and temporarily disable the boat. Operations of this type would have to be carefully executed to insure that the hazard was localized in the PT area to avoid danger to innocent shipping. While not feasible at present since the PT's have not commenced operations, it may be practicable at a later time.

e. Lures. Floating devices with explosive charges could be made into attractive lures by bright paint, emission of spurious signals (radio/noise) or given other distinguishing characteristics which would engender curiosity or demand investigation. These devices could be fuzed to explode in a number of ways (remote control, contact or by handling). The devices would be planted in the PT operating areas after they become known. Extreme care would be required in the conduct of such operations to insure that innocent shipping





was not endangered. Damage resulting from detonation of the lure could extend up to permanent destruction of the boat.

f. Deception. When the operational pattern is developed for the PT's, it might be possible to conduct deception operations that would result in their destruction. Drone targets, electronic/visual signals, changing positions of navigational aids or similar acts might be used to cause the PT's to run into shoal waters or onto a reef. This form of operation could also be used to divert the attention of patrolling PT's from other operations being conducted.

5. Although the Navy has ways and means available to destroy or neutralize the Cuban PT boats, none can be covertly executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more information is obtained on the degree of their security protection. Under conditions of overt warfare, the Navy can quickly dispose of the Cuban PT's. The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT's and will recommend appropriate means to dispose of them when an opportunity is presented.

/s/ George W. Anderson

GEORGE W. ANDERSON

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Hit 1 of 1

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10104
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1962
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 3360 (7 FEB 62)

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS
FROM : [No From]
TO : [No To]
TITLE : NORTHWOODS
DATE : 00/00/1962
PAGES : 197
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
SUBJECTS : U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA; CONTINGENCY
PLANNING, CUBA; OPERATION MONGOOSE; UPRISINGS IN CUBA;
COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA; SOVIET BASE IN CUBA;
CARIBBEAN SECURITY; PATROL POSTS; INVASION OF CUBA;
JUSTIFICATION FOR U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/1997
COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1962, Box 29. JCS Record Case, Code
Name Northwoods, containing JCS Papers related to JCS
recommendation to invade Cuba and pretexts to justify
US military intervention.

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JCS RECORD CASE NO. 3360 (7 Feb 62)		SECTION NO. 1		SEE SEC. NO.	IR ACCESS NO.	PREPARED BY
SUBJECT NORTHWOODS						
DATE	SOURCE	SC	CY	JCS PAPERS	REMARKS AND/OR SUBJECT	XX
8 Feb 62		T		JCSM 103-62		
28 Feb 62		T		JCSM 158-62		
28 Feb 62	DepSecDef	T				
1 Mar 62		T		SM-240-62		
1 Mar 62		T		SM-241-62		
1 Mar 62		T		SM-242-62		
1 Mar 62		T		SM-243-62		
8 Mar 62		T		JCSM-166-62		
13 Mar 62	CJCS	T				
10 Apr 62		T		JCSM 272-62		
8 May 62		T		JCSM 365-62		
8 May 62		T		JCSM-365-62		
8 May 62	DOD rep CSG	T				
8 May 62	DOD Rep CSG	T				
8 May 62	DOD R p CSG	T				
8 May 62		T		JCSM 367-62		
13 Jun 62	CJCS	T				
25 Jul 62		T		DJSM 909-62		
27 Jul 62		T		JCSM 564-62		
7 Aug 62		T		DJS Unnumbered		
8 Aug 62		T		CJCS Unnumbered		
31 Aug 62		T		CJCS Unnumbered		
31 Aug 62	DepSecDef	T				
31 Aug 62		T				
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JCS FORM NO. 2
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JCS RECORD CASE CONTENTS

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FILE NO. ⁶²
3360 (7 Feb 61)

CROSS INDEX NO'S
Code - NORTHWOODS
Name - CRAIG; B/Gen.
3330
5740

REQUEST INITIATED BY
SUBJECT- NORTHWOODS (S)

	DATE	AGENCY PAPER NO.	JCS PAPER NO.
Report by Gen. Craig; Referred to JCS	7 Feb 62 7 Feb 62		1969/303 1969/303 *
Decision on JCS 1969/303	8 Feb 62		
A Report; Referred to JCS	13 Feb 62		1969/306 *
Decision on JCS 1969/306	15 Feb 62		
A Report - Referred to the Chiefs	20 Feb 61		1969/310 *
A Report - Referred to the Chiefs	20 Feb 61		1969/311 *
Decision on JCS 1969/311	20-Feb-62		
Decision on JCS 1969/310-	20 Feb 62		
A Report - Referred to JCS	27 Feb 62		1969/313 *
A Report - Referred to JCS	27-Feb-62		1969/314 *
A Report Referred to JCS	5 Mar 62		1969/315 *
A Report Referred to JCS	5 Mar 62		1969/316 *
Decision on JCS 1969/314 & 1969/316	7 Mar 62		
A Report - referred to JCS	12 Mar 62		1969/321 *
Decision on JCS 1969/321	13 Mar 62		
Decision on JCS 1969/313	7 Mar 62		
A Report Referred to JCS	20-Mar-62		1969/324 *
Decision on JCS 1969/324	21-Mar-62		
A Report - Referred to JCS	23-Mar-62		1969/325 *
Decision on JCS 1969/325	27-Mar-62		
A Report Referred to JCS	29 Mar 62		1969/327 *
A Report referred to JCS	29 Mar 62		1969/328 *
Decision on JCS 1969/327	27 Mar 62		
Decision on JCS 1969/328	30 Mar 62		

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FILE NO.
3360 (7-Feb-62)
page 2

CROSS INDEX NO'S

REQUEST INITIATED BY SUBJECT- NORTHWOODS (S) Paper	DATE	AGENCY PAPER NO.	JCS PAPER NO.
A Paper Referred to JCS	9-Apr-62		1969/334 *
A Report Referred to JCS	9-Apr-62		1969/335 *
Decision on JCS 1969/334	10-Apr-62		
Decision on JCS 1969/335	10-Apr-62		
Report Referred to JCS	27-Apr-62		1969/343 *
Report Referred to JCS	27 Apr 62		1969/344 *
A Report Referred to JCS	2-May-62		1969/347 *
Decision on JCS 1969/343	8-May-62		
Decision on JCS 1969/344	8-May-62		
Decision on JCS 1969/347	9-May-62		
A Report referred to JCS	12-June-62		1969/366 *
A Report Referred to JCS	12-June-62		1969/367 *
Decision on JCS 1969/366	13 Jun 62		
Decision on JCS 1969/367	15 Jun 62		
A Report Referred to JCS	23 Jul 62		1969/389
Decision on JCS 1969/389	27-Jul-62		
A Report Referred to JCS	2 Aug 62		1969/392
Decision on JCS 1969/392	8 Aug 62		
A Report - Referred to JCS	31 Aug 62		1969/411 *
A Report - Referred to JCS	31 Aug 62		1969/412 *
Decision on JCS 1969/411	31 Aug 62		
Decision on JCS 1969/412	31 Aug 62		
A Report Referred to JCS	1 Sep 62		1969/413 *

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

22 1969/392

8 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Consequences of US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)

1. On 2 August 1962, the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation Mongoose, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement is to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention (in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment), effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a requirement for sustained occupation, the level of national mobilization required, and Cuban counteraction."

2. It is recommended that you approve the attached memorandum for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented). If more specific and detailed information is required by the Group, I will be prepared to provide it orally.

L. L. Lemnitzer

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 21 May 68
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7 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject: Consequences of US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS) (JCS 1969/392)

1. Pursuant to the discussion of the subject item at today's meeting of the Operations Deputies, the following material is submitted for addition to Enclosure A (page 4) of the subject paper:

"3. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, while agreeing that positive and successful military intervention in Cuba is fully within current US capability, is of the opinion that the attached memorandum is unduly optimistic in its appraisal of the force requirements, duration, and consequences of such an action. He has expressed the following reservations with respect to the several elements of the analysis:

" 'a. Cost (personnel, units, and equipment)

I notice that this element is treated in terms of the magnitude of force commitment and no specific estimate is made of cost in terms of personnel casualties, material consumed, and equipment to be replaced or rehabilitated. Even if this treatment is considered acceptable, I do not consider that the ground forces now shown are adequate for the intended purpose within the indicated time frame. If the Castro regime is to be confronted with the prospect of overpowering force, and casualties reduced by early capitulation, I consider that a minimum of three (3) infantry divisions should be introduced immediately after an entry point has been seized by amphibious/airborne assault.

" 'b. Level of National Mobilization Required.

(1) Adequate ground combat forces are available in our current force levels even if the scale of intervention

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is increased as indicated above. The same situation does not appear to apply with respect to tactical airlift and military government/civil affairs units. If all elements of the intervention force are to have the same degree of readiness and preparation, it would appear necessary to resort to partial prior mobilization in these areas.

(2) The foregoing consideration is addressed only to direct commitment in Cuba. Restoration of our capability to respond quickly to heightened tensions in other areas might well require additional mobilization approaching the scale of that undertaken during the Berlin crisis.

" 'c. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React.

A critical point here is the duration of involvement of major elements of our strategic reserve in Cuba. From examination of time and distance factors, and assessment of the probable level of opposition, I cannot agree that the indicated time frame is adequate to introduce and deploy forces of this magnitude, establish effective control, install an effective new government, turn over control to that government, withdraw and rehabilitate our forces, and place those forces in a renewed readiness posture in CONUS. In my opinion a much longer time would be involved and during this period our ability to respond to other crisis would be seriously reduced.

" 'd. Castro-Cuban Counteraction. The statement is made that Cuban defensive plans are believed to contemplate a strong initial resistance, followed by a determined defense of preselected keypoints, and finally by protracted guerrilla warfare. This statement is from the current National Intelligence Estimate which also states that the present military establishment as a whole is politically reliable.

If Castro's Cuba is only partially successful in the execution of its defensive plans, combat operations could be of considerably longer duration than anticipated with personnel and materiel casualties increasing proportionally.

"e. Possibility of a Requirement for a Sustained Occupation. The present wording makes no mention of the very real probability that a US provisional military government would be required for an extended period of time. Considering the size (44,206 sq. mi.) and population (6,743,000) of Cuba, its long history of political unrest, and its tradition of sustained and extensive guerrilla and terrorist resistance to constituted authority, the estimate that only a division-size force will be required subsequent to the assault phase appears modest. I consider it more probable that a clean-up and occupation force of three infantry divisions and associated support units would be required for a considerable period. This is in addition to the need for a military government/civil affairs establishment capable of directing the civil and economic affairs of Cuba until we can organize and install a successor regime capable of responsible self-government. This period of transition, re-organization, and economic rehabilitation might well continue for several years.' "



C. H. HAYES
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans)

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8 August 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/392

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meeting on 8 August 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative for Operation Mongoose as set forth in paragraph 7 of the subject paper, as amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A by:

- a. Substitution, in the heading of paragraph 2 on page 5, of the word "Requirements" for the word "Cost".
- b. Insertion, in subparagraph 2 a on page 5, of the words "key strategic areas in" after the words "seize control of".
- c. Substitution, in the first sentence of subparagraph 3 c on page 6, of the words "were originally" for the word "are" as well as the addition of the words "prior to D-day" at the end of that sentence. Additionally, deletion of the last sentence of that subparagraph.
- d. Changing the end of the first sentence of paragraph 4 on page 6 so as to read:- "...achieving control of key strategic areas of Cuba within 10-15 days. Further, in the second sentence of the same paragraph, the word "such" is substituted for the word "essential".

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8 August 1962

(Dec on JCS 1969/392 - Contd)

e. Changing subparagraph 4 b on page 7 by:

(1) Deletion, in the first sentence, of the word "only".

(2) Insertion of a new second sentence to read as follows:- "There may be a requirement for amphibious lift for rapid redeployment and counter-guerrilla activities until order has been restored."

(3) Substitution, in the present second sentence, of the words "30 to 45" for the words "approximately 20".

f. Insertion, at the beginning of the first sentence of subparagraph 4 c on page 7 of the words "It is estimated that the".

g. Deletion, in subparagraph 4 d on page 7, of all after the words "would be fully committed".

h. Deletion, in the second sentence of subparagraph 5 c on page 8, of all after the words "targets in Florida".

i. Deletion, in the last sentence of subparagraph 5 d on page 8, of all after the words "constantly increasing capabilities".

- 2 -

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
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8 August 1962

(Dec on JCS 1969/392 - Contd)

j. Changing the end of the first sentence of subparagraph 6 c on page 9 so as to read:- "...will consist of substantial Army follow-on forces with such other sea and air support as may be required."



M. J. INGELIDO
Colonel, USAF
Secretary

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

7 AUG 62
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BY JCS ON 21 May 84
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: JCS 1969/302 - The Consequences of US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)

1. I have reviewed the subject paper and recommend the following changes be made in order to amplify selected paragraphs therein as requested by Mr. Gilpatric on 6 August 1962:

a. Page 7, paragraph 4 d - add new last sentence as follows:

"To replace the airborne troop drop capability represented by 14 Air Reserve squadrons, it will be necessary to degrade theater airlift capabilities to the following extent for approximately 15 days:

"(1) Loss of 95% of PACAF total airlift and 15% of USAFE airlift; or

"(2) Loss of 100% of USAFE airlift and 50% of PACAF airlift; or

"(3) Loss of 70% of PACAF airlift and 50% of USAFE airlift."

b. Page 15, paragraph 4 - change to read as follows:

"4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React - The strength of the Cuban opposition and the resultant length of the operation will determine the total effect upon the US capability to react elsewhere. When the assault forces have been committed to the Cuban operation, the strategic Army forces in CONUS would be short the supporting forces such as engineer, medical, military police, signal and helicopter units for the remaining five divisions. Presuming achievement of . . . It is recognized, however, that certain combat and support elements will have to be retained in Cuba for counter-guerrilla and military government operations, and that engineer, medical, military police, signal and civil-affairs units will be required to support these and military government operations. These support units . . ."

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c. Page 15, paragraph 4, last line - add new sentence as follows:

"committed to a Cuban operation. To replace the airborne troop drop capability represented by 14 Air Reserve squadrons, it will be necessary to degrade theater airlift capabilities to the following extent for approximately 15 days:

"a. Loss of 93% of PACAF total airlift and 15% of USAFE airlift; or

"b. Loss of 100% of USAFE airlift and 50% of PACAF airlift; or

"c. Loss of 70% of PACAF airlift and 50% of USAFE airlift."

The readiness posture of SAC, . . .

HERBERT D. RILEY
Vice Admiral, USN
Director

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7 August 1962

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 21 Aug 62
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

Tentative Decision on:

JCS 1969/392

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED;
(NORTHWOODS) ~~NOT~~ RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

On 7 August 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff tentatively approved the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation Mongoose, as set forth in paragraph 7 of the subject paper itself amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A by:

- a. Substitution, in the first sentence of subparagraph 3 a, of the words "in lieu of" for the words "to obviate the necessity for".
- b. The addition, to the end of the first sentence of subparagraph 3 c, of the words, ", however, CINCLANT and Headquarters USAF have been requested to prepare alternative plans not involving any mobilization." Further, in the second sentence of subparagraph 3 c, the word "other" is substituted for the word "additional".
- c. The insertion, as a new first sentence to subparagraph 4 a, of the following:- "When the assault forces have been committed to the Cuban operation the strategic Army forces in the CONUS would be short the supporting forces for the remaining five divisions."
- d. The insertion, in subparagraph 4 d, of the word "CONUS" before the words "MATS airlift" and the words ", if mobilized, would be" before the words "about 30 per cent

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7 August
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e. The substitution, in subparagraph 6 b of the word "may" for the word "will" in the first sentence and the deletion of all of the last two sentences.

The Marine Corps requested a "hold" on implementation and indicated that it would phone-vote either (a) its final approval, or (b) its desire to add to the Enclosure a paragraph delineating the Commandant, Marine Corps' reservations concerning the draft memorandum contained in the Appendix to Enclosure A (in this event, these reservations will be submitted in writing by the Marine Corps). It was also agreed that the Joint Staff should dispatch an appropriate message implementing the action called for by the revision to the first sentence of subparagraph 3 c of the Appendix to Enclosure A. (NOTE: Subject message was subsequently dispatched as JCS 5602).

Should the Marine Corps confirm that it desires to include the Commandant's reservations as cited above, please reschedule this item as Agenda Item 1 for the Wednesday, 8 August meeting.

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M. J. Ingelido
M. J. INGELIDO
Colonel, USAF
Secretary

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Re 1969/389

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 21 May 84
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

JCSM-564-62
27 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: United States Contingency Plan No. 2,
Cuba (S)

1. As requested in memorandum for representatives of State, Defense, CIA and JSIA from Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning", dated 14 June 1962, the attached plan is forwarded for your approval, prior to delivery to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose.

2. It will be noted that the alternative methods of military intervention dealt with in this plan take three principal forms. These are, in descending order of magnitude:

a. A deliberate, orderly, large-scale operation capable of confronting the Castro regime with the prospect of over-powering force.

b. An accelerated initial reaction by lesser airborne and amphibious forces building up as feasible to the scale of the primary plan. This method entails greater risk, longer time to establish fully effective control and the probability of greater casualties on both sides.

c. An immediate and continuing air attack on Castro military forces and facilities to support and assist the revolting forces and to pave the way for subsequent operations.

3. The above described alternative methods conform essentially to current CINCLANT plans for contingency operations in Cuba.

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4. This plan was coordinated with the Department of State during preparation in order to be consistent with and complementary to the alternate plan prepared by State which addresses the contingency of an internal Cuban revolt but is limited to US actions less than military intervention.

5. Operations outlined within this plan for the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency and US Information Agency were prepared by each agency concerned.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure:
Plan

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
27 July 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/389
(NORTHWOODS) (S)

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 21 May 84
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

At their meeting on 27 July 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative to the Caribbean Survey Group as set forth in paragraph 9 of the subject paper as amended by:

- a. The deletion, from the beginning of the last sentence of subparagraph 3 b (3) (a) of the Appendix to Enclosure A, of the words "when relieved by Army units".
- b. Substitution, in subparagraphs 4 b and 4 d of the Appendix to Enclosure A, of the word "CINCLANT" for the words "the designated unified commander".
- c. CSAFM 229-62 itself amended by the withdrawal of paragraph 1 b.
- d. A Marine Corps Flimsy, this subject, dated 27 July 1962 itself amended by revision of the proposed paragraph 2 c, contained in paragraph 2, so as to read:-
"c. An immediate and continuing air attack on Castro military forces and facilities to support and assist the revolting forces and to pave the way for subsequent operations."

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M. J. Ingerido
M. J. INGERIDO
Colonel, USAF
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27 July 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/389

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meeting on 27 July 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of BGEN Harris as set forth in paragraph 9 of the subject paper as amended by:

- a. A change to subparagraph 3 b (3) (a) of the Appendix to Enclosure A.
- b. Changes to subparagraphs 4 b and 4 d of the Appendix to Enclosure A.
- c. CSAFM 229-62 itself amended by the withdrawal of paragraph 1 b.
- d. A Marine Corps Flimsy, this subject, dated 27 July 1962 itself amended in paragraph 2 by changes to the proposed paragraph 2 c.

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M. J. Ingelido
M. J. INGELIDO
Colonel, USAF
Secretary

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THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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DJSM-909-62
25 July 1962

*Filed
Wed 25-7n*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: US Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)

1. I have reviewed subject paper (JCS 1969/389) and recommend that the following changes be made in order to take full cognizance of the possible requirement for reducing military reaction time to less than eighteen (18) days.

2. Page 12, paragraph 3a(3), change to read as follows:

"(3) US Military Reaction

(a) With no prior warning . . . result in minimum US and Cuban casualties. ~~if there is a requirement . . . delete remainder of paragraph through (d)-Weather-(to-a limited-extent).~~

(b) A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period would necessitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be assembled and employed. The time required to gain essential US military control may be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. In such case, an airborne assault could be initiated in five (5) days followed by air-landed units as soon as airfields are

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secured. Navy/Marine amphibious forces could be committed within eight (8) days; follow on forces would be committed as they become available. Incremental commitment of forces increased the risk of heavier casualties on both sides.

(c) The Cuban situation could demand more immediate reaction than employment of airborne/amphibious forces can provide, possibly to forestall drastic reprisal actions by the Communist Cuban Government. US military plans will provide for a rapid commitment of air power, naval gunfire and initiation of a blockade prior to the airborne/amphibious assault."

3. To be consistent with changes recommended above, page 14, paragraph 3b(3) should be changed in the first two sentences as follows:

"(3) In concept, initial military operations commence with a sea-and-air blockade. On D-day a period of concentrated air strikes and coordinated Naval gunfire to will effect destruction of enemy air power and to neutralize neutralization and destroy destruction as much as possible of the enemy tank, armor, artillery, and anti-air capability. as-much-as-possible. The initial air strikes . . ."

HERBERT D. RILEY
Vice Admiral, USN
Director

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SPECIAL HANDLING

SECRET

25 July 1962

NOTE TO CONTROL DIVISION:

Subject: JCS 1969/389 - NORTHWOODS (S)

At their meeting on 25 July 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the subject paper along with CSAFM 226-62, DJSM-909-62 and a Marine Corps Flimsy, this subject, dated 25 July, all of which were tabled at this meeting, and agreed to defer this item. It was also agreed to refer the subject paper and all purples to General Harris for revision in the light of the discussion held at the meeting. Further, it was agreed to have this revision circulated with a view toward obtaining approval from each of the Joint Chiefs on an individual basis; should such approval not be obtained, this item will be rescheduled on the Friday, 27 July agenda.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 27 May 89
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M. J. Ingelido
M. J. INGELIDO
Colonel, USAF
Secretary

Copy to:

General Harris

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DECISION ON JCS 1969/389
A Note by the Secretaries
on
NORTHWOODS (S)
Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 27 July 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 9 of JCS 1969/389, subject to the following amendments:

a. A change to subparagraph 3 b (3) (a) of the Appendix to Enclosure A.

b. Changes to subparagraphs 4 b and 4 d of the Appendix to Enclosure A.

c. CSAFM 229-62 itself amended by the withdrawal of paragraph 1 b.

d. A Marine Corps Flimsy, this subject, dated 27 July 1962, itself amended in paragraph 2 by changes to the proposed paragraph 2 c.

2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/389.


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Page 2324

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWCDS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

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REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

US CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

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US CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

THE PROBLEM

1. As requested* by the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, to develop an interagency contingency plan for US military intervention in Cuba.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. It is possible that a spontaneous uprising could occur in Cuba. A resistance movement against the Communist Cuban government could develop a situation that the United States may desire to exploit.

3. The United States will pursue the overthrow of the Communist Cuban government.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

4. The Department of Defense/Joint Chiefs of Staff representative to the Caribbean Survey Group is responsible* for the preparation of a contingency plan for US actions which include military intervention, in a situation of open, wide-spread revolt in Cuba.

5. Normal readiness of forces will permit execution of CINCLANT Operations Plan No. 314-61** at any time subsequent to eighteen (18) days after the decision to implement the plan.

6. For additional facts bearing on the problem see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

7. For discussion see Enclosure C.

CONCLUSIONS

8. The plan attached at Enclosure A provides suitable response to the requirement for a contingency plan.

* Memo for representatives of State, Defense, CIA, USIA, from B/G Lansdale, subject, "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning," dated 14 June 1962; on file in Gen Harris' office.

** CINCLANT Contingency Operations Plan No. 314-61 (Cuba) (S), dated 22 July 1961, as amended; on file in Joint Secretariat.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

9. It is recommended that

a. The contingency plan at Enclosure A hereto be approved and forwarded to Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, through the Secretary of Defense.

b. A copy of this paper be forwarded to CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

DRAFT

ENCLOSURE A

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)

1. As requested in memorandum for representatives of State, Defense, CIA and USIA from Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning," dated 14 June 1962, the attached plan is forwarded for your approval, prior to delivery to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose.
2. It will be noted that the alternative methods of military intervention dealt with in this plan take three principal forms. These are, in descending order of magnitude:
 - a. A deliberate, orderly, large-scale operation capable of confronting the Castro regime with the prospect of over-powering force.
 - b. An accelerated initial reaction by lesser airborne and amphibious forces building up as feasible to the scale of the primary plan. This method entails greater risk, longer time to establish fully effective control, and the probability of greater casualties on both sides.
 - c. An immediate and continuing air attack on Castro military forces and facilities to support and assist the revolting forces and to pave the way for subsequent operations.
3. The above described alternative methods conform essentially to current CINCLANT plans for contingency operations in Cuba.
4. This plan was coordinated with the Department of State during preparation in order to be consistent with and

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1

Enclosure A

(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)

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complementary to the alternate plan prepared by State which addresses the contingency of an internal Cuban revolt but is limited to US actions less than military intervention.

5. Operations outlined within this plan for the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency and US Information Agency were prepared by each agency concerned.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure A

(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

Appendix to
Enclosure A

5

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

DRAFT

5412 SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Central Intelligence
The Director, US Information Agency

Subject: United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)

1. The attached plan delineates the course of action to be pursued by the United States in the event that US military intervention is undertaken in support of open, wide-spread revolt in Cuba.

2. Subject plan is effective for planning on receipt and for the conduct of operations when directed.

3. This document requires special handling and is not releasable to foreign nationals.

FOR THE 5412 SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED):

EDWARD G. LANSDALE
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief of Operations,
Operation MONGOOSE

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TITLE PAGE

1. The title of this document is:

UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

2. The title of this document is classified SECRET. The plan may be referred to as the Caribbean Survey Group (or, CSG) Plan No. 2, which name is unclassified unless related to Cuba.

3. This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Section 793 and 795, title 18, U.S.C.). Its transmission or revelation of the contents thereof in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

4. Reproduction of this document in whole or in part without permission of the Director of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE is prohibited except as necessary for the preparation of supporting plans. Distribution will be restricted to those US government agencies specifically requiring knowledge of the plan on a "Special Handling - Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals" basis.

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US CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

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US CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA. (S)

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*Distribution to asterisked agencies will not be made until such time as their participation is required in planning or implementation of the plan. When distribution is made to these agencies, only those portions of the plan which pertain to their participation will be disseminated.

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UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

Reference: Memorandum for Representatives of State, Defense, CIA and USIA, from Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning", dated 14 June 1962.

Task Agencies: Department of State
Department of Defense
Central Intelligence Agency
US Information Agency

1. Situation.

a. The purpose of this plan is to define the courses of action to be pursued by affected agencies of the US Government in the event that a decision is made that the United States undertake military intervention in Cuba.

b. The assumed situation in Cuba is open, wide-spread revolt. This contingency may be a non-US initiated situation, similar to that rumored as being activated for mid-June 1962. US actions to exploit the situation include the use of US military force.

c. It is assumed that this plan would be implemented under the following conditions, and would be considered for implementation under situations less severe. An internal revolt has created a chaotic situation in Cuba where:

- (1) The revolution is open and threatens the Communist regime;

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(2) Areas are taken and held by the revolutionaries,
and;

(3) Leadership of the revolt, unable to overthrow the government or sustain the revolution indefinitely, requests assistance from the United States and/or the Organization of American States (OAS).

d. The United States may, or may not, be able to determine that a rebellion is imminent before actual outbreak.

However, it is unlikely that the assumed situation will occur all at once and without notice. More probably it will evolve from a localized revolt which will provide some advance notice and the opportunity to initiate necessary diplomatic, propaganda, covert and military preparations.

e. The strength, morale, disposition and equipage of unfriendly forces will be assumed to be as described in current estimates of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

2. Mission.

The United States will support and sustain the rebellion in Cuba through all its resources including the use of US military force to assure replacement of the Communist regime with a new Cuban government acceptable to the United States.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) When the likelihood of emergence of a Cuban revolt becomes apparent to the US intelligence community it will be immediately brought to the attention of the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) through the Office of the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE. Evaluation of the situation by the Special Group will determine whether

or not the President's decision should be sought to implement this plan.

(2) The initial stages of a spontaneous revolt will be supported by the United States through propaganda, covert operations and other actions as necessary, but maintaining the appearance of non-US involvement should the revolt fail. In the event that the revolt spreads as a popular movement against the Communist regime, the United States should be capable of rapid military action to forestall a concerted and drastic reprisal program in the interest of humanity and the mission of this plan.

(3) US Military Reaction.

(a) With no prior warning and with eighteen (18) days of preparation a coordinated airborne-amphibious assault could be executed which, it is anticipated, would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within ten (10) days and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties.

(b) A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period would necessitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be assembled and employed. Under this circumstance the time required to gain essential US military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. In such case, air and naval forces could attack in support of the rebel Cubans with little delay from the time a decision is made. An air assault could be initiated within eight (8) hours, an airborne assault could be initiated within five (5) days and a Navy/Marine amphibious force could be committed three (3) days later with

a build up to the full-scale effort to follow.

(4) Execution of this plan will be in two (2) phases:

(a) Phase I. After Presidential decision, this phase will be undertaken by the Department of Defense supported by other agencies of the government. It will be initiated by overt US military assault on Cuba under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will be terminated at such time as essential military control is gained over the island. The operation is to be conducted as rapidly as possible, quickly to confront Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond enemy capability to resist and to reduce risk to US units initially deployed, with a view toward early capitulation of Cuban military units and avoidance of needless loss of life.

(b) Phase II. Following the establishment of essential US military control of the island, this phase will be primarily concerned with the restoration of law and order and the establishment of a new Cuban government friendly to the US. US military efforts will be directed primarily to matters of civil affairs and military government in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. Military operations essential for the elimination of small pockets of resistance and restoration of law and order throughout the island will continue. Major US combat forces will be withdrawn as early as security may permit. Operational responsibility of the Department of Defense will cease at the time the Department of State assumes responsibility for civil administration of Cuba.

b. Department of Defense Operations.

(1) When directed by higher authority, or as the situation demands, the Department of Defense will initiate preparatory actions for US military intervention in Cuba. These actions may include pre-positioning forces and equipment by execution of current cover and deception plans.

(2) Upon final decision of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct execution of military intervention plans for Cuba.

(3) In concept, initial military operations commence with a blockade, concentrated air strikes and coordinated Naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy air power and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy tank, armor, artillery, and anti-air capability.

(a) In western Cuba airborne and amphibious assaults will be conducted by a Joint Task Force with the initial objective of seizing the city of Havana and obtaining control over the seat of government. Army airborne units will secure the major airfields in the area as well as major port areas required for follow-on forces and logistic resupply. Navy/Marine amphibious forces will secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Havana and designated Army units will follow the Marines over the beach. The Marine amphibious forces will be prepared to re-embark for further operations as directed.

(b) In eastern Cuba, Guantanamo will be reinforced by air- and sea-lifted Marines for defense

(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)

of the base. Additional Navy/Marine amphibious forces will be employed in operations against Cuban forces in the Santiago de Cuba complex or in other operations in eastern Cuba as directed.

(4) Subsequent to the seizure of Havana and Santiago and the successful defense of Guantanamo, operations will be conducted to defeat remaining pockets of resistance. Additional amphibious and airborne operations may be required. The most likely areas for such operations are: Matanzas, Nuevitas, Nicaro, Trinidad, Bahia de Cochinos, and the Isle of Pines.

(5) At such time as essential US military control is gained in Cuba, matters of civil affairs and military government will be given priority and undertaken in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. This includes provision for a provisional military government prepared to assume full legislative, executive, and judicial control until such functions can be turned over to other authority on direction in an expeditious and orderly manner. Remaining resistance elements of the Communist Cuban government, armed forces or other groups will be isolated, contained and destroyed or captured as rapidly as possible. US military combat units will be scheduled for early return to the United States consistent with security considerations.

c. Department of State Operations.

(1) Phase I. The Department of State will seek to place the United States in as broad a multilateral context as possible.

(a) Immediately sound out Latin American Governments to determine whether the United States can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing the use of military forces under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty.

(b) If 2/3 majority is available, request the Council of the Organization of American States to convoke immediately a meeting of foreign ministers under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and obtain Organization of American States (OAS) decision authorizing use of force.

(c) Seek agreement from at least two Latin American nations (preferably not Nicaragua or Guatemala) to provide token forces to join United States forces.

(d) If 2/3 majority cannot be mustered, recognize the anti-Castro forces as the Government of Cuba and, in response to its appeal for help, come to its assistance with United States military forces and whatever foreign token forces have been made available.

(e) Keep key members of Congress informed of significant developments.

(f) Inform all friendly governments of our actions and the reasons therefor; obtain public expressions of their support and of their sympathy for the anti-Castro forces. Warn them to expect communist directed violence and offer them assistance.

(g) Notify the OAS and the United Nations (as appropriate) of our actions and be prepared to defend them in these international bodies.

(h) Engage in all-out psychological warfare and propaganda stressing the morality of United States action designed to assist the Cuban people throw off the bonds of communist enslavement.

(2) Phase II - (Post Invasion)

(a) Provide immediate emergency economic and other assistance to the Cuban populace.

(b) Turn over as rapidly as possible to the Cuban Government for administration of the territory taken by United States troops and assist that government to the extent feasible as it requests.

(c) Make preparations to provide the Cuban Government with long range economic assistance.

(d) Take measures to assist the Cuban Government to control entry into and exit from Cuba.

(e) Re-establish the United States country team in Havana.

d. Central Intelligence Agency Operations.

(1) CIA operations against Cuba are controlled by a component of CIA Headquarters, Washington. Operational elements are located in the vicinity of Miami, Florida, with sub elements at other Florida locations.

(2) In the event of localized revolt, CIA will give covert support to the revolt through introduction of communications, arms, equipment and trained personnel as appropriate and feasible.

(3) When US Military intervention is directed and contingency plans are implemented, CIA will fully support the military actions in accordance with the JCS/CIA Command Relationship Agreement, whether it is implemented or not.

(4) Liaison and communications will be established prior to implementation of CINCLANT and subordinate plans.

(5) CIA will support military operations by clandestine intelligence, counter intelligence, propaganda, political and paramilitary operations.

(6) After the initial assault and during the subsequent consolidation and occupation phase, CIA will designate selected personnel from CIA Headquarters and/or CIA operations base, Florida, to proceed to Cuba and conduct clandestine operations in support of US forces and objectives. Ultimately, the bulk of CIA Florida based personnel will be transferred to Cuba to establish a permanent CIA station and bases.

e. United States Information Agency Operations.

(1) The Agency will provide complete, but strictly factual and impartial informational coverage to a spontaneous revolt in its initial phase. The purpose of such coverage will be to keep the people of Cuba, and of the hemisphere, fully informed of developments, and to set the stage for possible subsequent courses of action. Extreme caution will be taken to avoid the appearance of US involvement during this phase so as to nullify possible later charges of US intervention (by Cuba or other Latin American governments) should the revolt fail. In this context, the Agency during this phase must carefully refrain from a type or tone of coverage that might be construed as incitement to riot.

(2) In the event of direct US involvement, the Agency will:

(a) Assign informational specialists to work with Defense Psywar units during combat operations.

(b) Staff up a regular USIS unit to move into Havana with the Department of State contingent at the time and place to be decided on by the Department.

(c) Prepare for immediate shipment all physical equipment and resources necessary to support a USIS operation in Cuba.

(3) Basic considerations in Agency informational support of direct US military action:

(a) Medium wave radio should receive priority attention for any over combat operation in Cuba. Immediately upon securing any beachhead or other enclave on the island, and perhaps immediately prior to or concurrent with such action, massive medium wave broadcasting should begin. A beefed-up Guantanamo

transmitter, leased U.S. Florida facilities, floating transmitters and, as soon as possible, captured Cuban station(s) should be assigned to this task. Short wave facilities will also be increased to provide necessary backup.

(b) The messages of this initial phase should be simple and direct, reassuring the people of their personal safety and the protection of their individual rights, instructions on the maintenance of public order, the distribution of food and medical attention, all done hopefully in a Cuban context and with only the minimum of reference to US military forces and power necessary to maintain order and to assure credibility of the inevitability of Castro's rapid and complete defeat.

(c) Care must be exercised, particularly with the anti-Castro Cubans, to avoid alienating possible support by immediate talk of vengeance, or of indications of possible loss of any gains (housing, land, social benefits) which might have accrued to the peasant and worker groups during the Castro regime.

(d) Given the relatively high rate of literacy in Cuba, wall posters and leaflets reiterating the themes of the broadcasts should also be available and utilized as soon as practical, the leaflets by air drop ahead of military action where deemed advisable.

(e) Any provisional military government must also have a news bulletin for factual news summaries and instructions to the civilian population.

(f) In all psychological planning, special attention should be given to avoiding in so far as possible

any indications of plans to return to the status quo ante, all information output should be designed to reassure the populace that the US supported movement is designed to carry forward the realization of the social and economic aspirations of the Cuban people.

f. Department of the Treasury

Department of Justice

Department of Health, Education and Welfare

Department of Agriculture

Federal Aviation Agency

Bureau of the Budget

Supporting functions will be undertaken to assist, expedite and promote the efforts of Task Agencies:

a. As requested by Task Agencies, prior to plan implementation, and

b. As requested by Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, when plan is implemented.

4. Coordinating Instructions.

a. Implementation of this plan will be as directed by the President.

b. Military operations, including clandestine and paramilitary activities, will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The administration of military government activities in Cuba will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.

c. Political, psychological and economic operations will be accomplished in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.

d. Supporting plans are required from all Task Agencies. Direct coordination between agencies should be effected for planning purposes. One copy of supporting plans is to be provided Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, and maintained in current status.

e. During implementation of the plan the Chief of Operations, Operation MongOOSE, will act as the coordinator for the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) on inter-Agency activities. The coordinating office will be established in the Pentagon, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Room 2 B 913, telephone extension 59710.

ENCLOSURE B

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 22 May 1962 approved CINCLANT Operational Plan 318-62* which provides cover for US preparations for military intervention in Cuba.

2. Planning for US military intervention in Cuba with a reaction time reduced to five (5) days is currently in process but has not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

3. CIA operations against Cuba are controlled by Commander Task Force "W" which is a component of CIA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. The primary operational element is the CIA unit located in the vicinity of Miami, with sub elements at other Florida locations. CIA will support the military operation in the event US military action is taken against Cuba.

4. Sub-paragraphs of the execution paragraph of the basic plan, outlining separate departmental and agency participation, were provided by the agency concerned.

* CINCLANT Operations Plan No. 318-62; on file in Joint Secretariat

** CINCLANT Operations Plan No. 316-62; on file in Joint Secretariat

Enclosure B

ENCLOSURE C

DISCUSSION

1. The approved military plan for US intervention in Cuba can be executed in eighteen (18) days from a condition of no warning. It is not anticipated that funds will be expended nor units pre-positioned to reduce this reaction time, unless, of course, such preparatory measures can be clearly related to imminent military action. Extensive troop training at this time for a Cuban operation which may not be executed within the next few years is of questionable value. Similarly, prestockage of supplies, pre-positioning of forces and activation of ships from the reserve fleet does not appear justified if such preparations have no likelihood of being required in the foreseeable future.

2. It is unlikely that a spontaneous uprising in Cuba could develop and sustain itself for an appreciable length of time without active and positive US military support. It is expected that the United States would maintain an appearance of non-involvement prior to any decision to intervene. It is therefore important that US forces be capable of more rapid response than eighteen (18) days, first, to sustain a revolt and, second, to react adequately to irrational acts or reprisals by the Communist Cuban government.

3. Although there are increased risks involved in committing US forces in incremental deployments such risks may have to be faced. The most rapid reaction possible would be to employ air power, which is currently being planned by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This air plan could be the difference between success or failure of any popular uprising in Cuba. The use of air power should be followed as rapidly as possible by the air-dropped/air-landed assault as planned in CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62, with follow-on amphibious forces introduced as soon as feasible, and a build up to the full-scale effort of CINCLANT (PLAN 314-61).

TOP SECRET

13 June 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/366

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

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At their meeting on 13 June 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative to the Caribbean Survey Group as set forth in paragraph 9 of the subject paper, as amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A by:

a. Substitution, in the second sentence of paragraph 2, of the words "urgency for" for the words "complexity of" and deletion of the words "and increase the risk of Soviet retaliation elsewhere." from the end of the sentence. Additionally, paragraph 2 is redesignated as paragraph 3.

b. Deletion of paragraph 3.

c. Deletion of the word "However" from the beginning of the first sentence of paragraph 4 and of the words "in the face of increased risk of Soviet countermeasures elsewhere." from the end of the sentence. Additionally, all of the last sentence of paragraph 4 is deleted and the paragraph is redesignated as paragraph 2.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 21 May 84
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

M. J. Ingelido
M. J. INGELIDO
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Secretary

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13 June 1962


Decision on:

JCS 1969/366

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meeting on 13 June 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of BGEN Craig as set forth in paragraph 9 of the subject paper, as amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A by:

- a. Changes to paragraph 2 and redesignation as paragraph 3.
- b. Deletion of paragraph 3.
- c. Changes to paragraph 4 and redesignation as paragraph 2.


M. J. INGELIDO
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Secretary

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14 June 1962

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DECISION ON JCS 1969/366
A Note by the Secretaries
on
NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. On 13 June 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 9 as amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A by:

- a. Change to paragraph 2 and redesignation as paragraph 3.
- b. Deletion of paragraph 3.
- c. Change to paragraph 4 and redesignation as paragraph 2.

2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.


3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/366.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
21 May 84
REVIEWED

I. J. BLOUIN

I. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat



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JCS 1969/366

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12 June 1962

Page 2257

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

* Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat

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JCS 1969/366

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TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

12 June 1962

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REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

SOVIET BASE IN CUBA (S)

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TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

SOVIET BASE IN CUBA (S)

PROBLEM

1. In response to a request* from Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, to determine an appropriate course of action for the United States to take in event that the Soviets establish a military base in Cuba.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The problem stated above was initially posed by Mr. Robert Kennedy at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on 22 March 1962.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, noting the increased complexities attending the delay of US intervention in Cuba, have previously recommended** that a national policy of early military intervention be adopted by the United States which should be undertaken as soon as possible and preferably before the release of National Guard and Reserve forces on active duty.

4. US military intervention will be required to assure the final and successful overthrow of the Communist Cuban government.***

DISCUSSION

5. For discussion see Enclosure B.

CONCLUSIONS

6. The United States cannot tolerate the permanent existence of a communist government in Cuba.

7. Military intervention by the United States will be required to overthrow the Communist Cuban regime.

* Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Brig. Gen. Lansdale, subject: "Status of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose", dated 8 June 1962, on file in Gen. Craig's office.

** JCS 1962/335

*** "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose", dated 14 March 1962, on file in Gen. Craig's office.

8. The establishment of a Soviet Base in Cuba will increase the complexity of US military action in Cuba and increase the risk of Soviet countermeasures elsewhere.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. It is recommended that:

a. The Memorandum at Enclosure A, with its Appendix which reflects the above conclusions, be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval in order that the Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) may be tabled at the meeting scheduled for 14 June 1962.

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Soviet Base in Cuba (S)

1. Reference is made to Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Brig. Gen. Lansdale, subject: "Status of Requested Studies, Operation MongOOSE", dated 8 June. This memorandum requested the opinion of all participating agencies having membership in the Special Group concerning the appropriate course of action for the United States to take in the event the Soviets establish a military base in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of the attached memorandum as the position of the Department of Defense.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

J. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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DOES NOT APPLY

Enclosure A

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject: Soviet Base in Cuba (S)

1. In response to a Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Director of Operations, Operation Mongoose, subject: "Status of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose," dated 8 June 1962, the Department of Defense has considered the problem of an appropriate course of action for the United States to take in event that the Soviets should establish a military base in Cuba.

2. In the event that a Soviet base is established on the island, the choice of US counteraction is between long term acceptance of a communist state in the Caribbean with an increasing military threat to the United States from the South, or US military intervention. It is considered that the latter course of action would be the only solution compatible with the security interests of the United States.

3. It is believed that military intervention by United States forces will be required to successfully overthrow the Communist Cuban regime. Establishment of a Soviet Base in Cuba would increase the urgency for US military action in Cuba.

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Appendix to
Enclosure A

(Page revised as directed by the JCS, 13 June 1962)

ENCLOSURE B

DISCUSSION

1. The United States cannot tolerate permanent existence of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere. The present regime in Cuba provides communism with a base of operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion against Latin America. The stability of some governments in Latin America is already threatened by the overt and covert actions of the Cuban government. Continued existence of this communist government increases the probability that one or more other nations in Latin America will become communist or communist dominated. This will greatly increase the problems currently facing the United States and the Organization of American States. While considered unlikely, it is possible for the Sino-Soviet Bloc to establish military bases in Cuba similar to US installations around the bloc periphery. Establishment of such bases would increase US defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet the threat.*

3. Time favors the Cuban regime and the communist bloc. They are provided with the opportunity to continue with their subversion efforts in Latin America. Increasing internal security measures by police state methods decrease the possibility of internal uprisings within Cuba. The steady improvement in military defenses strengthens the resistance which must be overcome in the event of US military intervention and could lengthen the time required to secure control of the government and the island. The continuing indoctrination of the Cuban youth creates a growing nucleus for a communist underground after the elimination of the present government. This creates a problem for the future which is steadily increasing in magnitude.

* JCS 1969/335

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DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

3. There is nothing to prevent the Soviets from eventually establishing their own base in Cuba. US acceptance of a Soviet base, or bases, in Cuba might avoid the risk of Soviet retaliation to US military action but such acceptance would also generate a greater eventual risk to the United States from the improved Soviet general war posture.

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Soviet Base In Cuba (S)

1. Reference is made to Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Brigadier General Lansdale, subject: "Status of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose", dated 8 June. This memorandum requested the opinion of all participating agencies having membership in the Special Group concerning the appropriate course of action for the United States to take in the event the Soviets establish a military base in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of the attached memorandum as the position of the Department of Defense.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. Lemnitzer
L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON *21 May 84*
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

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DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

28 June 62

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject: Soviet Base in Cuba (S)

1. In response to a memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from the Director of Operations, Operation Mongoose, subject: "Status of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose", dated 8 June 1962, the Department of Defense has considered the problem of an appropriate course of action for the United States to take in event that the Soviets should take steps to establish a military base in Cuba.
2. In the event of such a contingency, the choice of US counteraction is between long term acceptance of a communist state in the Caribbean with an increasing military threat to the United States from the South or US military intervention. Our present view is that the latter course of action would be the only solution compatible with the security interests of the United States.

rm Gelpat

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JCS 1969/347

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9 May 1962

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DECISION ON JCS 1969/347
A Note by the Secretaries
on

NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. On 9 May 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations contained in JCS 1969/347.
2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/347.



F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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21 May 84
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JCS 1969/347

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2 May 1962

Page 2213

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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JCS 1969/347

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REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OR

MARITIME SUPPORT, OPERATION MONGOOSE (TS)

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NW 47874 DocId:32276301 Page 95
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

MARITIME SUPPORT, OPERATION MONGOOSE (TS)

THE PROBLEM

1. To respond to a request by the Secretary of Defense for a report on ways of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of action.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 14 March 1962, the Secretary of Defense requested* a report on ways of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of action.

3. On 16 March 1962, the Chief of Naval Operations was requested to submit a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff** on ways of putting Cuban PT boats out of action.

4. On 3 April 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense that the Navy was studying means to put the Cuban PT boats out of action and that report would be submitted when the study was completed.***

5. On 26 April 1962, the Chief of Naval Operations submitted the requested report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.**** Copy attached (Appendix to Enclosure).

CONCLUSION

6. The Memorandum, Enclosure, for the Secretary of Defense, together with its Appendix, is an appropriate response to the request from the Secretary of Defense for possible ways of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of action.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that:

a. The Enclosure, together with its Appendix, which reflects the above conclusion, be approved and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

*Memorandum on file in General Craig's office.

**CM 610-62 dtd 16 Mar 1962

***JCS 1969/325

****On file in General Craig's office.

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Maritime Support, Operation Mongoose (TS)

1. In response to your question* of whether there is some way of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of action, the enclosed memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is forwarded for your information.

2. The enclosed memorandum sets forth some possible covert/ clandestine ways and means of putting the Cuban PT boats out of action but states in substance that none can be covertly executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more information is obtained on the degree of security protection afforded the boats and a pattern of operations has been established.

3. The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT's and will recommend appropriate means to dispose of them when an opportunity is presented.

*Memorandum on file in Brig General Craig's office.

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4

Enclosure

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In reply refer to
OP605F/br
Ser 000374P60

April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Maritime Support, Operation MONGOOSE (TS)

References: a. CM 610-62 of 16 Mar 1962
b. CNO memo for the JCS, Ser 000314P60
of 20 Mar 1962

1. Reference a requested the Chief of Naval Operations to provide specified information on PT type craft, maritime support needs, and ways of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of action. Reference b provided certain data on PT craft and specified maritime support.

2. The Cuban PT's are fast (up to 45 knots), highly maneuverable, and possess a credible armament consisting of 4-25 mm (twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo tubes (two torpedoes) and from 12-16 depth charges. In overt conventional naval war operations these boats would be put out of action quickly, although an anti-PT defense would have to be established to protect our troop/cargo carrying ships until the PT's were eliminated. The primary means of destroying PT craft would be aircraft delivered rocket/gunfire and surface ship gunfire.

3. There have been no reports on the operations of the Cuban PT's. They have been delivered by Soviet ships to Havana, offloaded and sailed under their own power to Mariel. Eight boats are presently located at Mariel. Four PT's, delivered in early April, were still in Havana at last report, but are expected to move to Mariel in the near future. The only way to put these boats out of action while they are in port is by means of agents or swimmer (ULF type) sabotage. Operations

within harbors to put these PT's out of action are risky in that there is a probability that agents/swimmers would be captured with subsequent exposure and US complicity. After the PT's commence to operate, their pattern of operations will be studied so as to establish methods to dispose of them outside of their harbors. A wider spectrum of actions with less risk should become practical after their pattern of operations is established.

4. Possible covert/clandestine ways and means of putting Cuban PT craft out of action include the following:

a. Fuel contamination. Fuel contamination could be accomplished either by inserting foreign material (chemicals) directly into the craft's fuel system or the fuel supply ashore (POL). Delivery of the contaminant would be by agent or swimmer. Resultant damage would be temporary mechanical. Risk of detection would be high, results would be minimal in comparison.

b. Limpet mines/demolition charges. Underwater swimmers, launched from submarines under cover of darkness could penetrate the PT base and attach limpet mines to the underwater body of the craft. Agents could install demolition charges in the boats at their piers. Damage resulting from limpets/demolition charges would be major resulting in destruction and/or sinking of the boat. Risk of detection in operations of this type against Havana or Mariel would be high. PT berths in both harbors are in secure areas making agent delivery very difficult. Both harbors are landlocked with narrow entrances from the sea. The PT's are moored at piers well inside the harbor and not on a direct line from the entrance. The entrances are guarded by continuously manned machine gun posts on both sides of the entrance. Boats are known to patrol during the day, no information is available on night boat patrol activity. The

currents in the entrances are swift. This would possibly require a swimmer to penetrate on a flood tide and remain inside the harbor until the ebb tide before he would be able to effect his escape. Under these conditions, the risk of swimmer detection through accident (equipment malfunction or similar difficulty) would be higher than the benefits to be realized by such operations.

c. Logistic sabotage. Sabotage of any portion of the spare parts supply system would minimize operational availability of the boats. Agents would be required to perform the sabotage. Insufficient information is available on the logistic supply system to evaluate the risks involved.

d. Floating debris. Placing floating debris (logs, fishing nets, etc.) in PT operating areas would create an operational hazard. If a PT struck a solid object, the resultant damage would range from minor hull damage to destruction depending on the speed and angle at which the object was struck. Fishing nets, rope and similar material would foul the screws and temporarily disable the boat. Operations of this type would have to be carefully executed to insure that the hazard was localized in the PT area to avoid danger to innocent shipping. While not feasible at present since the PT's have not commenced operations, it may be practicable at a later time.

e. Lures. Floating devices with explosive charges could be made into attractive lures by bright paint, emission of spurious signals (radio/noise) or given other distinguishing characteristics which would engender curiosity or demand investigation. These devices could be fuzed to explode in a number of ways (remote control, contact or by handling). The devices would be planted in the PT operating areas after they become known. Extreme care would be required in the conduct of such operations to insure that innocent shipping

was not endangered. Damage resulting from detonation of the lure could extend up to permanent destruction of the boat.

f. Deception. When the operational pattern is developed for the PT's, it might be possible to conduct deception operations that would result in their destruction. Drone targets, electronic/visual signals, changing positions of navigational aids or similar acts might be used to cause the PT's to run into shoal waters or onto a reef. This form of operation could also be used to divert the attention of patrolling PT's from other operations being conducted.

5. Although the Navy has ways and means available to destroy or neutralize the Cuban PT boats, none can be covertly executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more information is obtained on the degree of their security protection. Under conditions of overt warfare, the Navy can quickly dispose of the Cuban PT's. The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT's and will recommend appropriate means to dispose of them when an opportunity is presented.

/s/ George W. Anderson
GEORGE W. ANDERSON

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JCSM-367-62
8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Maritime Support, Operation Mongoose (TS)

1. In response to your question of whether there is some way of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of action, the enclosed memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is forwarded for your information.
2. The enclosed memorandum sets forth some possible covert/ clandestine ways and means of putting the Cuban PT boats out of action, but states in substance that none can be covertly executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more information is obtained on the degree of security protection afforded the boats and a pattern of operations has been established.
3. The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT's and will recommend appropriate means to dispose of them when an opportunity is presented.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

G. H. DECKER
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Encl:
Memo from CNO

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21 May 64
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.In reply refer to
OP605F/br
Ser 000374P60

24 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Maritime Support, Operation MONGOOSE (TS)

References: a. CM 610-62 of 15 Mar 1962
b. CNO memo for the JCS Ser 000314P60
of 20 Mar 1962

1. Reference a requested the Chief of Naval Operations to provide specified information on PT type craft, maritime support needs, and ways of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of action. Reference b provided certain data on PT craft and specified maritime support.

2. The Cuban PT's are fast (up to 45 knots), highly maneuverable, and possess a credible armament consisting of 4-25 mm (twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo tubes (two torpedoes) and from 12-16 depth charges. In overt conventional naval war operations these boats would be put out of action quickly, although an anti-PT defense would have to be established to protect our troop/cargo carrying ships until the PT's were eliminated. The primary means of destroying PT craft would be aircraft delivered rocket/gunfire and surface ship gunfire.

3. There have been no reports on the operations of the Cuban PT's. They have been delivered by Soviet ships to Havana, offloaded and sailed under their own power to Mariel. Eight boats are presently located at Mariel. Four PT's, delivered in early April, were still in Havana at last report, but are expected to move to Mariel in the near future. The only way to put these boats out of action while they are in port is by means of agents or swimmer (UD type) sabotage. Operations

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within harbors to put these PT's out of action are risky in that there is a probability that agents/swimmers would be captured with subsequent exposure and US complicity. After the PT's commence to operate, their pattern of operations will be studied so as to establish methods to dispose of them outside of their harbors. A wider spectrum of actions with less risk should become practical after their pattern of operations is established.

4. Possible covert/ clandestine ways and means of putting Cuban PT craft out of action include the following:

a. Fuel contamination. Fuel contamination could be accomplished either by inserting foreign material (chemicals) directly into the craft's fuel system or the fuel supply ashore (POL). Delivery of the contaminant would be by agent or swimmer. Resultant damage would be temporary mechanical. Risk of detection would be high, results would be minimal in comparison.

b. Limpet mines/demolition charges. Underwater swimmers, launched from submarines under cover of darkness could penetrate the PT base and attach limpet mines to the underwater body of the craft. Agents could install demolition charges in the boats at their piers. Damage resulting from limpets/demolition charges would be major resulting in destruction and/or sinking of the boat. Risk of detection in operations of this type against Havana or Mariel would be high. PT berths in both harbors are in secure areas making agent delivery very difficult. Both harbors are landlocked with narrow entrances from the sea. The PT's are moored at piers well inside the harbor and not on a direct line from the entrance. The entrances are guarded by continuously manned machine gun posts on both sides of the entrance. Boats are known to patrol during the day, no information is available on night boat patrol activity. The

currents in the entrances are swift. This would possibly require a swimmer to penetrate on a flood tide and remain inside the harbor until the ebb tide before he would be able to effect his escape. Under these conditions, the risk of swimmer detection through accident (equipment malfunction or similar difficulty) would be higher than the benefits to be realized by such operations.

c. Logistic sabotage. Sabotage of any portion of the spare parts supply system would minimize operational availability of the boats. Agents would be required to perform the sabotage. Insufficient information is available on the logistic supply system to evaluate the risks involved.

d. Floating debris. Placing floating debris (logs, fishing nets, etc.) in PT operating areas would create an operational hazard. If a PT struck a solid object, the resultant damage would range from minor hull damage to destruction depending on the speed and angle at which the object was struck. Fishing nets, rope and similar material would foul the screws and temporarily disable the boat. Operations of this type would have to be carefully executed to insure that the hazard was localized in the PT area to avoid danger to innocent shipping. While not feasible at present since the PT's have not commenced operations, it may be practicable at a later time.

e. Lures. Floating devices with explosive charges could be made into attractive lures by bright paint, emission of spurious signals (radio/noise) or given other distinguishing characteristics which would engender curiosity or demand investigation. These devices could be fuzed to explode in a number of ways (remote control, contact or by handling). The devices would be planted in the PT operating areas after they become known. Extreme care would be required in the conduct of such operations to insure that innocent shipping

was not endangered. Damage resulting from detonation of the lure could extend up to permanent destruction of the boat.

f. Deception. When the operational pattern is developed for the PT's, it might be possible to conduct deception operations that would result in their destruction. Drone targets, electronic/visual signals, changing positions of navigational aids or similar acts might be used to cause the PT's to run into shoal waters or onto a reef. This form of operation could also be used to divert the attention of patrolling PT's from other operations being conducted.

5. Although the Navy has ways and means available to destroy or neutralize the Cuban PT boats, none can be covertly executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more information is obtained on the degree of their security protection. Under conditions of overt warfare, the Navy can quickly dispose of the Cuban PT's. The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT's and will recommend appropriate means to dispose of them when an opportunity is presented.

/s/ George W. Anderson

GEORGE W. ANDERSON

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED;
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

8 May 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/344

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

On 8 May 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative to the Caribbean Survey Group as set forth in paragraph 11 of the subject paper.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 21 May 64
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

M. J. Ingelido
M. J. INGELIDO
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Secretary

Copy to:

General Craig

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SECRET

8 May 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/344

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

On 8 May 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved
BGEN Craig's recommendations as set forth in paragraph 11
of the subject paper.

M. J. Ingelido

M. J. INGELIDO
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Secretary

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON *2 May 84*
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

at 1968/004

JCSM-365-62

8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: DOD Task No. 38, Operation MONGOOSE

1. Pursuant to the requirements set forth in DOD Task No. 38 the Department of Defense was requested to review the present arrangements for granting asylum to Cuban refugees at Guantanamo Naval Base, with the view of granting asylum to all Cubans so desiring it, at the Naval Base.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the recommendations outlined in the attached memorandum be approved.

FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

G. H. DECKER
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JCSM-366-62

8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: DOD Task No. 46, Operation MONGOOSE

1. Pursuant to the DOD Task 46, the Department of Defense was requested to examine the possibility of establishing patrol posts in the Caribbean area, with particular emphasis on a United States manned patrol post in Haiti, to guard against any invasion attempt at that country from Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the results of this examination, outlined in the attached memorandum, be approved.

FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

G. H. DECKER
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

21 May 62

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: JCS 1969/347 - Maritime Support,
Operation Mongoose (TS)

1. On 14 March 1962, the Secretary of Defense inquired whether there is some way of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban PT boats out of action.
2. The attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense forwards a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations, which sets forth some possible ways and means of putting the Cuban PT boats out of action, but states in substance that it is not practicable to carry out the operations at this time and that appropriate recommendations will be submitted at a later date.
3. Some possible ways of putting the Cuban PT boats out of action enumerated are fuel contamination, sabotage, and one or more of the following: limpet/demolition charges, floating debris, lures and deception operations.
4. The Operations Deputies approved the attached memo for the Secretary of Defense, together with its enclosure, on 7 May 1962 for transmittal to the Secretary of Defense. It is recommended that you approve and sign the attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, which forwards the CNO report.

21 May 62 *William H. Craig*
WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brig. General, USA
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: DOD Task No. 38, Operation MONGOOSE

1. In accordance with Task No. 29 the Department of Defense was requested to undertake a review of the present arrangements for the use of Guantanamo Naval Base for asylum. The review included all legal, political and security aspects in addition to development of recommendations on the feasibility and desirability of granting asylum to all Cubans so desiring at Guantanamo Naval Base.

2. The Operations Deputies approved such a document responsive to this task on 8 May 1962. It is recommended that you approve and sign the attached memorandum forwarding the results of this review to the Secretary of Defense.

William H. Craig
WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brig General, USA
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

12551909/343
8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: DOD Tas: No. 46, Operation MONGOOSE

1. In accordance with Task No. 46, the Department of Defense was requested to examine the possibility of establishing patrol posts in the Caribbean, to be manned by personnel from one or several countries. Particular attention was to be given to the possibility of such an establishment, to be purely United States, in Haiti so as to guard against any invasion attempt at that country from Cuba.

2. The Operations Deputies approved the results of this examination and recommendations responsive to this task on 8 May 1962. It is recommended that you approve and sign the attached memorandum forwarding the results to the Secretary of Defense.

William H. Craig
WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brig General, USA
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group

21 May 64

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON JCS 1969/343

A Note by the Secretaries

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. On 8 May 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation set forth in paragraph 11 of the paper.
2. In that the Commandant has expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/343.



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21 May 1962

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JCS 1969/343

27 April 1962

Page 2209.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the


JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

ESTABLISHMENT OF "P. TROL POSTS" (U)

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TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

ESTABLISHMENT OF "PATROL POSTS" (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To respond to a request* from the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, to examine the possibility of establishing "patrol posts" in the Caribbean.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. The term "patrol posts" is assumed to include any agency or facility which could contribute to an anti-invasion and infiltration surveillance system. Such an agency could be overt or covert in nature and could be purely US, bi-national, or multi-national in nature.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. By memorandum to the DOD/JCS Representative, Caribbean Survey Group, dated 17 April 1962, the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, requested an examination of the possibility of establishing "patrol posts" in the Caribbean. Particular attention was to be given to the possibility of such an establishment, to be purely US, in Haiti, so as to guard against any invasion attempt at that country from Cuba.

4. For additional Facts Bearing on the Problem, see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

5. For discussion, see Enclosure C.

CONCLUSIONS

6. Cuban military forces lack the capability to launch a meaningful military invasion against any Caribbean country with the possible exception of Haiti. In the case of Haiti, the capability is limited to a lightly armed invasion using a few aircraft and/or small boats. Surveillance of Cuban coastal areas and the entire Caribbean is within the capability of the US Atlantic Command. Forces of this command, assisted by military forces of the country concerned, are capable of combatting successfully any invasion attempts by Cuba.

*On file in General Craig's office

7. From a military point of view, the primary value of air-sea "patrol posts", would be in acquiring advance information of Cuban actions and indications of intentions. Due to the nature of the likely Cuban threat, i.e., infiltration and subversion supporting an indigenous revolutionary movement, the value of surface "patrol posts" is questionable.

8. Based upon the past experience of the Department of State in exploring the possibility of arranging for bilateral agreements with Central American governments to provide assistance for defense against communist infiltration and subversion, it is not feasible for the US to sponsor at this time the establishment of arrangements necessary for the "patrol posts" through bilateral agreements.

9. At the 8th Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS, member States collectively took recognition of the threat posed to the Western Hemisphere by communist infiltration. One of the actions taken to combat this threat was the establishment of a Special Consultative Committee on Security to study the threat and make recommendations on measures which should be taken to preserve the peace and security of the hemisphere. It is possible that this committee may develop a multi-lateral proposal for such action.

10. An early availability of an amphibious training and staging facility required in Haiti for use of Fleet Marine Force elements of the Atlantic Fleet as previously expressed* by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, could assist in the performance of the functions envisioned for a US manned "patrol post" in Haiti.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. It is recommended that:

- a. The attached memorandum, Enclosure A, together with its Appendix, which reflects the above conclusions, be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

* Decision on JCS 570/547

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b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

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ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Establishment of "Patrol Posts"(U)

It is recommended that the attached memorandum, subject as above, be approved and forwarded to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose.

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Enclosure A

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, OPERATION MONGOOSE

Subject: Establishment of "Patrol Posts" (U)

1. By memorandum to the DOD/CS Representative, Caribbean Survey Group, dated 17 April 1962, the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, requested an examination of the possibility of establishing "patrol posts" in the Caribbean manned by personnel from one or several countries. Particular attention was to be given to the possibility of such an establishment, to be purely US, in Haiti, so as to guard against any invasion attempt at that country from Cuba. For the purposes of this examination, "patrol posts" were assumed to be any agency or facility which could contribute to an anti-invasion and infiltration surveillance system. Such an agency could be overt or covert in nature and could be purely US, bi-national or multi-national in nature.

2. Cuban military forces lack the capability to launch a meaningful military invasion against any Caribbean country, with the possible exception of Haiti. In the case of Haiti, the capability is limited to a lightly armed invasion using a few aircraft and/or small boats. Surveillance of Cuban coastal areas and the entire Caribbean is within the capability of the US Atlantic Command. These forces, assisted by military forces of the country concerned, are capable of combatting successfully any invasion attempts by Cuba. In this respect, the US through the Ambassador in the Central American Countries, Colombia and Venezuela, has informed the Presidents of the respective countries orally that the US was prepared to establish, upon request of the local government, a system of air-sea surveillance to assist in seeking out, and interdicting within

national jurisdiction of the requesting state, attempted landings of armed forces, agents or supplies by Castro-Communist elements and otherwise to assist local governments to identify and frustrate armed assistance to such subversive elements. This commitment was not afforded Haiti.

3. From a military point of view, the primary value of air-sea "patrol posts", would be in acquiring advance information of Cuban actions and indications of intentions. Due to the nature of the likely Cuban threat, i.e., infiltration and subversion supporting an indigenous revolutionary movement the value of surface "patrol posts" is questionable.

4. Based upon the past experience of the Department of State in exploring the possibility of arranging for bilateral agreements with Central American governments to provide assistance for defense against communist infiltration and subversion (aversion to entering into bilateral defense agreements with the US), it is not feasible for the US to sponsor at this time the establishment of "patrol posts" through bilateral agreements.

5. At the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS, member States collectively took recognition of the threat posed to the Western Hemisphere by communist infiltration. One of the actions taken to combat this threat was the establishment of a Special Consultative Committee on Security to study the threat and make recommendations on measures which should be taken to preserve the peace and security of the hemisphere. It is possible that this committee may develop a multilateral proposal for such action.

6. By JCSM-5-62,* dated 4 January 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated a requirement for an amphibious training and staging facility in Haiti for use of Fleet Marine Force elements of the Atlantic Fleet. In reply to the letter from the Deputy

*On file in Joint Secretariat

Appendix to
Enclosure A

Secretary of Defense, dated 6 March 1962, which transmitted the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Under Secretary of State stated on 20 March 1962 that:

"The establishment of military facilities in Haiti raises a number of basic questions with respect to our policy toward the present (Duvalier) regime, and requires most careful consideration."

The Department of State is currently conducting an analysis of our future policy in regard to the present government of Haiti. An early availability of a US facility in Haiti, however, could assist in the performance of the functions envisioned for a US manned "patrol post" in Haiti.

7. During this critical period, maximum use will continue to be made of US forces in the Caribbean area (CINCLANT, CINCARIB, MAAGs, Missions, and Attaches) in cooperation, where possible, with Latin American military forces to perform the functions envisioned for the "patrol posts." For example, training operations at Guantanamo Naval Base, normal patrol activity, and traffic between that base and US naval installations in Puerto Rico provide effective air-sea surveillance of eastern Cuba and the island of Hispaniola including Haiti.

8. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that no further action be taken in regard to the establishment of "patrol posts," *at this time.*

Appendix to
Enclosure A

ENCLOSURE B

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Foreign Ministers of the Organization of the American States (OAS) at their eighth meeting* took cognizance of the threats to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere as a result of communist infiltration. The Council of the OAS (COAS) was requested to "maintain all necessary vigilance, for the purpose of warning against any acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security, or the preparation of such acts, resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in this hemisphere, and to make recommendations to the governments of the member states with regard thereto."

2. As directed by the Foreign Ministers of the OAS at their eighth meeting, the COAS has established a Special Consultative Committee of experts on security and has charged this committee with studying the threat to the hemisphere and recommending to the COAS measures which should be taken to maintain the peace and security. This Special Committee is to submit the initial report by 1 May 1962 and subsequent reports as available. General Thomas D. White, USAF/Retired, is a member selected from the United States.

3. On 10 May 1961, the Department of State by message** to US Ambassadors of Central American countries explored the possibility of consummating bilateral and later multilateral agreements with various countries to defend against communist infiltration and subversion. Responses from addressees indicated most governments were not responsive to such arrangements and opposition could be expected. This

* Final Act of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Doc. 68 (English) Rev., dated 21 Jan 62; on file in Joint Secretariat;

** Department of State message, Circular 1761, dated 10 May 61; on file in Joint Secretariat;

proposal was discarded and instead, the US Ambassadors to the Central American countries were requested by message* on 2 November 1961, to inform the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of host countries orally that the US Government recognized the Caribbean countries as likely targets of communist subversion or attack and that it was prepared to establish, upon request of a local government, a system of air-sea surveillance to assist in seeking out, and interdicting within the national jurisdiction of the requesting state, attempted landings of armed forces, agents or supplies by Castro-Communist elements and otherwise to assist local governments to identify and frustrate armed assistance to such subversive elements. In respect to Haiti, the Department of State stated, "Serious question has been raised as to whether materiel and other kinds of assistance against indirect aggression in addition to that already being made available to the Haitian Government should be given in present circumstances, particularly because of the apparent aspiration of President Duvalier to perpetuate himself in office indefinitely."

4. On 15 May 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by memorandum** to the Secretary of Defense stated, "While it is recognized that there may be overriding political considerations which dictate the negotiation of such bilateral and multilateral assistance agreements, they cannot be recommended from a military point of view."

* Department of State message, Circular CA-388, dated 2 Nov 61; on file in Joint Secretariat
** Decision on JCS 1976/365

ENCLOSURE C

DISCUSSION

1. The communist threat to the Western Hemisphere through infiltration and subversion was recognized by the Foreign Ministers of the OAS at their 8th Meeting at Punta del Este and action was initiated to find means to combat it. The results of the COAS Special Committee should provide measures which could be taken on a collective basis to guard against and combat the threat.

2. Cuban military forces lack the capability to launch a meaningful attack against any Latin American country with the possible exception of Haiti. In the case of Haiti, the capability is limited to a lightly armed invasion using a few aircraft and/or small boats.

3. Any invasion of a Caribbean country by Cuban forces would serve only to further unite the governments of Latin America and lead to collective OAS action under the terms of the Treaty of Non-Intervention. Further, a Cuban landing on the territory of another country could provide a valid justification for US military intervention in Cuba. Any attempt to export communism from Cuba would be most likely by infiltration and subversion and would take the form of an indigenous revolutionary movement, supported by arms from Cuba and perhaps Cuban volunteers, and would be made to appear as an uprising against the incumbent government.

4. Surveillance of Cuban coastal areas and the entire Caribbean is within the capability of US aircraft and/or ships assigned to the Atlantic Command. Also, US forces and facilities in the Caribbean are adequate to prevent any invasion of a Caribbean country by Cuban forces. From a military point of view, the primary value of "patrol posts" would be in acquiring advanced information of Cuba's actions and indications of intentions. The value of ground "patrol posts", even considering governmental agreements could be effected, is questionable in view of the nature of the threat from Cuba.

5. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider there is little military justification for establishing multilateral forces for use in the Caribbean area, the political results of such an effort may have some value in gaining further recognition of the threat and in strengthening national ties between participating countries. Based upon the past indications from Central American governments in regard to the negotiation of bilateral assistance agreements, and the present relations between the US and Cuba, it does not appear feasible for the US to sponsor a "patrol post" concept in the Caribbean area at this time. Additionally any consideration of such a proposal must consider the possible effects on the treaty with Cuba for the use of Guantanamo Naval Base, if it is to be used as a "patrol post."

6. In specific regard to a ground "patrol post" in Haiti, the Joint Chiefs of Staff by memorandum* to the Secretary of Defense, dated 4 January 1962, stated there was a requirement for an amphibious training and staging facility in Haiti and requested that the Department of State, subject to political assessment of the political considerations involved, make necessary governmental arrangements for the conduct of surveys and for subsequent arrangements on specific requirements that are developed. The Department of State has indicated a reluctance to negotiate with the present Government of Haiti until a thorough analysis is made with respect to US policy toward the present Duvalier regime. The early availability of this facility, however, would meet any requirement for a US "patrol post" in Haiti. In the meantime, training operations at Guantanamo Naval Base, normal patrol activity, and traffic between that base and US naval installations in Puerto Rico provide effective air-sea surveillance of eastern Cuba and the island of Hispaniola including Haiti.

7. The most feasible course of action, likely to be acceptable to the countries concerned, to contend with Cuban infiltration and subversion of Caribbean countries lies in collective efforts of the OAS. Past indications from governments of Caribbean countries have been to the effect that collective OAS efforts and actions are defensible and rational, whereas unilateral and bilateral actions carry a competition of recognition of sovereignty. the

case, appropriate consideration of the recommendations for action, to be submitted by the Special Committee on Security of the COAS, should provide a basis to accomplish the objective.

8. During this interim period, maximum use should continue to be made of US forces in the Caribbean area (CINCLANT, CINCARIB, MAAG's, Missions, and Attaches) and the Latin American military forces to perform the functions envisioned for the "patrol posts."

9. Any actions to establish "patrol posts" as such in the Caribbean area would require appropriate "cover" to hide or obscure the real purpose. While several means are available, (civilian commercial interests, activities associated with the Atlantic Missile Range, etc.), the ostensible purpose would surely invoke strong reaction from the Cuban government and might jeopardize the over-all security of "Operation Mongoose."

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JCSM-272-62
10 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cuba

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban problem must be solved in the near future. Further, they see no prospect of early success in overthrowing the present communist regime either as a result of internal uprisings or external political, economic or psychological pressures. Accordingly they believe that military intervention by the United States will be required to overthrow the present communist regime.

2. The United States cannot tolerate permanent existence of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere. The present regime in Cuba provides communism with a base of operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion against Latin America. The stability of some governments in Latin America is already threatened by the overt and covert actions of the Cuban government. Continued existence of this communist government increases the probability that one or more other nations in Latin America will become communist or communist dominated. This will greatly increase the problems currently facing the United States and the Organization of American States. While considered unlikely, it is possible for the Sino-Soviet Bloc to establish military bases in Cuba similar to US installations around the bloc periphery. Establishment of such bases would increase US defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet the threat.

3. Time favors the Cuban regime and the communist bloc. They are provided with the opportunity to continue with their subversive efforts in Latin America. Increasing internal security measures by police state methods decrease

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the possibility of internal uprisings within Cuba. The steady improvement in military defenses strengthens the resistance which must be overcome in the event of US military intervention and could lengthen the time required to secure control of the government and the island. The continuing indoctrination of the Cuban youth creates a growing nucleus for a communist underground after the elimination of the present government. This creates a problem for the future which is steadily increasing in magnitude.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States can undertake military intervention in Cuba without risk of general war. They also believe that the intervention can be accomplished rapidly enough to minimize communist opportunities for solicitation of UN action. Forces available would assure rapid essential military control of Cuba. Continued police action would be required.

5. In view of the increasing military and subversive threat to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere posed by the communist regime in Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a national policy of early military intervention in Cuba be adopted by the United States. They also recommend that such intervention be undertaken as soon as possible and preferably before the release of National Guard and Reserve Forces presently on active duty.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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JCS 1969/335

10 April 1962

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
Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 10 April 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 6 of the report submitted by JCS 1969/335, after making amendments to the memorandum in Enclosure A thereto.
2. The memorandum, as amended, was forwarded as JCSM-272-62, to the Secretary of Defense.
3. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
4. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/335.

F. J. BLOVIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat



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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

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A report* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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9 April 1962

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REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
CUBA (IS)

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CUBA (TS)

THE PROBLEM

1. To develop the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with reference to two questions posed by General Taylor at the meeting of the Special Group (5412), 5 April 1962, related to possible sentences for the invasion prisoners as follows:

a. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States should intervene?

b. Does the United States have the capability to intervene?

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. Past considerations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been reviewed for opinions or decisions related to General Taylor's first question. Two studies are appropriate; however, both studies were directly concerned with the current Cuba Project (Mongoose).

a. The first study,* dated 8 February 1962:

A significant conclusion of this study states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the overthrow of the Communist Cuban Regime can be accomplished without precipitating general war and without serious effect on world public opinion if, among other things, the impression is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba.

b. The second study,** dated 16 March 1962:

This study repeated the above decision, but further,

* JCS 1969/303

** JCS 1969/313

appended a list of circumstances which could be considered sufficient provocation for US military intervention in Cuba. One of the situations listed, which depended upon degree of seriousness, is stated:

"Execution of prisoners taken in the abortive attempt of April 1961."

3. For additional facts bearing see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

4. For discussion see Enclosure C.

CONCLUSIONS

5. The Secretary of Defense should be advised during the meeting of 10 April that execution of 100 or more Cuban prisoners should be exploited (with pretexts and an expanded propaganda campaign if necessary) by the US as justification for intervention.

6. The Secretary of Defense should be advised that there is no question of US capability to intervene, and that the deliberate course of implementing such action within 18 days after decision is more prudent than the faster but riskier course of piecemeal force commitments.

7. Inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not addressed the question of US military intervention in Cuba except within the context of Operation Mongoose it appears desirable that military action be recommended to the Secretary of Defense and/or the President as the only course which provides assurance that the Communist Cuban regime can be removed in the important time frame of the near future.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:

a. Conclusions 5 and 6 above be reflected as the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the meeting with the Secretary of Defense 10 April 1962.

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b. The memorandum at Enclosure A be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense to express the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning US military intervention in Cuba outside the context of Operation Mongoose.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

e. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

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ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cuba (TS)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban problem must be solved in the near future. Further, they see no prospect of early success in overthrowing the present communist regime either as a result of internal uprisings or external political, economic or psychological pressures. Accordingly they believe that military intervention by the United States will be required to overthrow the present communist regime.

2. The United States cannot tolerate permanent existence of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere. The present regime in Cuba provides communism with a base of operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion against Latin America. The stability of some governments in Latin America is already threatened by the overt and covert actions of the Cuban government. Continued existence of this communist government increases the probability that one or more other nations in Latin America will become communist or communist dominated. This will greatly increase the problems currently facing the United States and the Organization of American States. While considered unlikely, it is possible for the Sino-Soviet Bloc to establish military bases in Cuba similar to US installations around the bloc periphery. Establishment of such bases would increase US defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet the threat.

3. Time favors the Cuban regime and the communist bloc. They are provided with the opportunity to continue with their subversive efforts in Latin America. Increasing internal security measures by police state methods decrease

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Enclosure A

(Page revised as directed by the JCS, 10 April 1962)

the possibility of internal uprisings within Cuba. The steady improvement in military defenses strengthens the resistance which must be overcome in the event of US military intervention and could lengthen the time required to secure control of the government and the island. The continuing indoctrination of the Cuban youth creates a growing nucleus for a communist underground after the elimination of the present government. This creates a problem for the future which is steadily increasing in magnitude.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States can undertake military intervention in Cuba without risk of general war. They also believe that the intervention can be accomplished rapidly enough to minimize communist opportunities for solicitation of UN action. Forces available would assure rapid essential military control of Cuba. Continued police action would be required.

5. In view of the increasing military and subversive threat to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere posed by the communist regime in Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a national policy of early military intervention in Cuba be adopted by the United States. They also recommend that such intervention be undertaken as soon as possible and preferably before the release of National Guard and Reserve forces presently on active duty.

ENCLOSURE B.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. With regard to the question concerning US capability to intervene in Cuba, implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 will assure forceful and rapid overthrow of the Cuban government within 10 days after forces are committed. As recently as 3 April 1962 CINCLANT (in response to a Joint Chiefs of Staff query concerning the adequacy of forces in his OPLAN) has advised that contingencies which could complicate the campaign against Cuba have been recognized and considered acceptable hazards. CINCLANT states, ". . . it is my judgment that the forces in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 are adequate to gain essential control of Cuba within the estimated 10 days." CINCLANT qualifies this judgment to depend on the following:

"a. Intelligence available to this command concerning the current strength, capabilities, morale, and locations of Cuban military forces is essentially correct.

"b. The amphibious assault lift now available in LANTCOM and PACOM is, as an absolute minimum, maintained at no less than present levels and improved and increased as feasible.

"c. Certain of the "on call" army forces now listed in the plan are reclassified as reserve forces and put in motion in time to arrive in the objective area on or before D plus 10."

2. While the fastest means of assuring completion of the total task in Cuba is OPLAN 314-61, the situation may require initial reaction by the US in less than 18 days. A calculated risk could be considered, providing piecemeal commitment of US forces as rapidly as they and their transportation become available. This is CINCLANT OPLAN 316-61, and although not approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was returned to CINCLANT for rewrite. Representative reaction times, proposed in OPLAN 316-61 from a condition

Enclosure B

of no warning were:

- 2 ABN Divisions - 5 days
- 4 Marine BLTs - 7-8 days
- Artillery and Armor - 10-12 days
- Follow-on Forces - 15-18 days

ENCLOSURE C

DISCUSSION

1. In addition to related considerations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, additional factors which support US intervention in Cuba, if 100 or more prisoners are executed, are:

a. Guidelines established for Phase II of Operation Mon-goose, already approved by the Special Group, indicate that military intervention must eventually be resorted to for overthrow of the Communist Cuban regime.

b. The passage of time favors Castro rather than the US.

c. Justification for US intervention will probably be more convincing to the rest of the world if it can be related to a real and valid provocation rather than based entirely on manufactured pretexts which entail some risk of compromise. The US could, however, bolster the justification for intervention, if required, to provide a stronger case for US military action.

d. Execution of significant numbers of prisoners would adversely affect the faith and resolution of refugee Cubans and the Cuban underground in future attempts to resist the Communist regime, if they feel that the US has ignored, in apparent disinterest, the final chapter of last year's invasion attempt.

2. US intervention in Cuba could trigger Bloc diversionary tactics in other parts of the world (most probably in known trouble spots such as Laos, South Vietnam, Korea, the Offshore Islands, Berlin or possibly the Mid-East) and would likely engender propaganda campaigns to include use of the UN forum for pressure against the US. However, the essential and most important element of the US play against Cuba is speed. CINCLANT's OPLAN states, "Some 6 days subsequent to gaining control, conditions should permit withdrawal of assault forces,

Enclosure C

leaving small military units to conduct civil affairs and counter-guerrilla mop-up operations." Estimating from D-5 therefore, it should be expected that US forces committed to Cuba will be unavailable for other contingencies for only about 20 days, although the Marine Division Wing Team from the West Coast will be in poor position for immediate redeployment for some time longer.

3. The fastest means of applying force against Cuba would be through the use of US air power (Naval plus USAF), although this would be an interim measure until surface forces could be deployed. This capability, now being prepared by CINCLANT as a new and separate plan, could be utilized for destruction of Cuban air power, reduction of ground forces (especially armor), and disruption of Cuban communications and utility systems. This plan to be operable in 6 hours in the strength desired by CINCLANT will require prepositioning of 12 Air Force Squadrons in Florida.

Enclosure C

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EXPLANATORY NOTE

One of the requirements which evolved from the JCS Meeting, 6 April, was to up-date JCS 2304/30. That document has been reviewed and up-dating appears infeasible for the following reasons:

a. JCS 2304/30 was written in April 1961 to expand forces involved in CINCLANT Plan 312-60, from two battle groups to a force level considered adequate to cope with the improved Cuban military capability. Force levels are increased from two battle groups to two divisions plus a third division in reserve. This plan was overtaken by CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61, which further increased the total forces required to the extent that the augmented plan 312-60 was superseded. The plan for Cuba in JCS 2304/30, therefore, is no longer valid; the plan should in fact be withdrawn.

b. Much of the related information included in JCS 2304/30 not strictly concerned with the military plan is reflected in the more current papers published in support of the Cuban Project (Operation Mongoose).

10 April 1962

1969/334

At their meeting on 10 April 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the subject papers which were tabled at the meeting. JCS 1969/334 was noted and used as a background paper by the Joint Chiefs in their discussion with the Secretary of Defense at their 1430 meeting this date.

This is an Extract from the JCS minutes of 10 April. (Original of the minutes is filed ~~in the JCS file~~
in Secretary JCS file)

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JCS 1969/334

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10 April 1962

[Handwritten signature]

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DECISION ON JCS 1969/334
A Note by the Secretaries
on
NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries


1. At their meeting on 10 April 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the talking paper submitted by JCS 1969/334 and it was used by them as a background paper in the discussion at their 10 April 1962 meeting with the Secretary of Defense.
2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/334

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DECLASSIFICATION
21 May 84

F. J. BLOVIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat

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9 April 1962

Page 2186

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A talking paper* on the above subject is submitted for approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN,

M. J. INGELIDO,

Joint Secretariat

* Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat EXCLUDED FROM GDS

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JCS 1969/334

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9 April 1962

Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS for the SecDef Meeting,
10 April 1962

Subject: US Intervention in Cuba

Background - At the meeting of the Special Group (augmented) on 5 Apr 62, General Taylor questioned the US course of action in the event Castro decided to execute about 100 of last April's invasion prisoners. Inconclusive discussion led General Taylor to ask, "Suppose Castro decided to shoot them all, what would we do then?" Mr. Johnson, for State, expressed the opinion that even this extreme would not provide sufficient justification for US military action. Mr. Galpatric, for Defense, and Gen Parker for the JCS, indicated they felt both the DOD and the JCS would stand firm for military intervention.

- During the JCS meeting, 6 Apr 62, discussion of this subject developed two basic questions:

- a. Do the JCS believe the US should intervene?
- b. Does the US have the capability?

Discussion - Past considerations of the JCS have been reviewed for opinions or decisions related to General Taylor's first question. Two studies are appropriate; however, both studies were directly concerned with the current Cuba Project (Mongoose).

- a. JCS 1969/303, 8 Feb 62:

A significant conclusion of this study states that the JCS believe the overthrow of the Communist Cuban Regime can be accomplished without precipitating general war and without serious effect on world public opinion, if, among other things, the impression is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba.

- b. JCS 1969/313, 16 Mar 62:

This study repeated the above decision, but further, appended a list of circumstances which could be considered sufficient provocation for US military intervention in Cuba. One of the situations listed, which depended upon degree of seriousness, is stated:

"Execution of prisoners taken in the abortive attempt of April 1961."

- In addition to these related considerations of the JCS, additional factors which support US intervention in Cuba, if 100 or more prisoners are executed, are:

- a. Guidelines established for Phase II of Operation Mongoose, already approved by the Special Group, indicate that military intervention must eventually be resorted to for overthrow of the Communist Cuban Regime.
- b. The passage of time favors Castro rather than the US.
- c. Justification for US intervention will probably be more convincing to the rest of the world if it can be related to a real and valid provocation rather than based entirely on manufactured pretexts which entail some risk of compromise.

The US could, however, bolster the justification for intervention, if required to provide a stronger case for US military action.

d. Execution of significant numbers of prisoners would adversely affect the faith and resolution of refugee Cubans and the Cuban underground in future attempts to resist the Communist regime, if they feel that the US has ignored in apparent disinterest, the final chapter of last year's invasion attempt.

- With regard to the question concerning US capability to intervene in Cuba, implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 will assure forceful and rapid overthrow of the Cuban government within 10 days after forces are committed; forces can be committed 18 days after the order is given. As recently as 3 Apr 62 CINCLANT (in response to a CS query concerning the adequacy of forces in his OPLAN) has advised that contingencies which could complicate the campaign against Cuba have been recognized and considered acceptable hazards. CINCLANT states, "... it is my judgment that the forces in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 are adequate to gain essential control of Cuba within the estimated 10 days." CINCLANT qualifies his judgment to depend on the following:

"a. Intelligence available to this command concerning the current strength, capabilities, morale, and locations of Cuban military forces is essentially correct.

"b. The amphibious assault lift now available in LANTCOM and PACOM is, as an absolute minimum, maintained at no less than present levels and improved and increased as feasible.

"c. Certain of the 'on call' Army forces now listed in the plan are reclassified as reserve forces and put in motion in time to arrive in the objective area on or before D plus 10."

- While the fastest means of assuring completion of the total task in Cuba is OPLAN 314-61, the situation may require initial reaction by the US in less than 18 days. A calculated risk could be considered, providing ~~placental~~ commitment of US forces as rapidly as they and their transportation become available. This was proposed in CINCLANT OPLAN 316-61, and, although not approved by the JCS, was returned to CINCLANT for rewrite. Representative reaction times, proposed in OPLAN 316-61 from a condition of no warning were:

2 ABN Divisions	- 5 days
4 Marine-BLTs	- 7-8 days
Artillery and Armor	- 10-12 days
Follow-on Forces	- 15-18 days

- The fastest means of applying force against Cuba would be through the use of US air power (Naval plus USAF), although this would be an interim measure until surface forces could be deployed. This capability, now being prepared by CINCLANT as a new and separate plan, could be utilized for destruction of Cuban air power, reduction of ground forces (especially armor), and disruption of Cuban communications and utility systems. This plan to be operable in 6 hours in the strength desired by CINCLANT will require prepositioning of 12 Air Force Squadrons in Florida.

- US intervention in Cuba could trigger Bloc diversionary tactics in other parts of the world (most probably in known trouble spots such as Laos, South Vietnam, Korea, the

Offshore Islands, Berlin or possibly the Mid-East) and would likely engender propaganda campaigns to include use of the UN forum for pressure against the US. However, an essential and most important element of the US plan against Cuba is speed. CINCLANT's OPLAN states, "Some 5 days subsequent to gaining control, conditions should permit withdrawal of assault forces, leaving small military units to conduct civil affairs and counter-guerrilla mop-up operations." Estimating from D-5 therefore, it should be expected that US forces committed to Cuba will be unavailable for other contingencies for only about 20 days, although the Marine Division Wing Team from the West Coast will be in poor position for immediate redeployment for some time longer.

Recommendations -

a. SECDEF should be advised during the meeting of 10 Apr that execution of 100 or more Cuban prisoners should be exploited (with pretexts and an expanded propaganda campaign if necessary) by the US as justification for intervention.

b. SECDEF should be advised that there is no question of US capability to intervene and that the deliberate course of implementing such action within 18 days after decision is more prudent than the faster but riskier course of piecemeal force commitments.

c. Inasmuch as the JCS have not addressed the question of US military intervention in Cuba except within the context of Operation Mongoose it appears desirable that military action be recommended to the SECDEF and/or the President as the only course which provides assurance that the Communist Cuban regime can be removed in the important time frame of the near future.

Opinion as to Recommendations:

DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group _____ (Concur) (Nonconcur)

Director, Joint Staff _____ (Concur) (Nonconcur)

Talking Paper prepared by: Colonel C. S. Seamans, USAF
Contingency Plans Branch, J-5
Extension 59057



3 April 1962

Decision on

JCS 1969/328

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meeting on 30 March the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the forwarding of a memorandum (CM-628-62) with attachment to the Secretary of Defense.

F. J. Blouin
F. J. BLOUIN
Rear Admiral, USN
Secretary

Copy for:
General Craig

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE *21 May 87*



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3 April 1962

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DECISION ON JCS 1969/328
A Note by the Secretaries
on
NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries


1. At their meeting on 30 March 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the forwarding of a memorandum (CM-628-62), with attachment, to the Secretary of Defense.
2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/328.

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M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

3 April 1962



Decision on

JCS 1969/327

(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meeting on 27 March 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the assumptions which had been agreed to by the Special Group for Operation MONGOOSE.

F. J. Blouin
F. J. BLOUIN
Rear Admiral, USN
Secretary

Copy for:
~~General~~ General Craig


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DATE 21 May 88

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3 April 1962

Decision on

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
At their meeting on 27 March 1962 the
Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the subject paper.


F. J. BLOUIN
Rear Admiral, USN
Secretary

Copy for:
General Craig

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DECISION ON JCS 1969/327
A Note by the Secretaries
on

NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 27 March 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted JCS 1969/327.
2. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/327.

F. J. BLOUIN


M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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GUIDELINES, OPERATION MONGOOSE

The Special Group (Augmented) agreed that planning and preparations would proceed on the basis of the following assumptions:

(extracted from Gen Lansdale's copy of the "Guidelines", dated 14 March 1962)

"a. In undertaking to cause the overthrow of the target government, the United States will make maximum use of indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognize that final success will require decisive US military intervention.

"b. Such indigenous resources as are developed will be used to prepare for and justify this intervention, and thereafter to facilitate and support it".

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1969/327

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. Lemnitzer

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 21 May 84 BY [signature]

1 Enclosure

Memo for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project

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12 March 1962

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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JCS 1969/321

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9 March 1962

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REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

CUBA PROJECT (TS)

The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested
that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on this matter by 13 March 1962.

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JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)

THE PROBLEM

1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise description of pretexts which they consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action.

3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of action proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area.

4. For additional facts see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

5. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A are based on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations forum should be favorably affected by developing the international image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible, and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere.

6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the present time it will continue to hold good only as long as there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is

* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.

** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Chief of Naval Operations, subject: "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.

as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore, since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time frame of the next few months

CONCLUSION

7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However, these suggestions should be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:

a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request* of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

* Memorandum for Gen Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject, "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in Gen Craig's office

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)

1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.

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4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that projects would be operable within the next few months.

5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba).

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.

2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):

- (1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
- (2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base.
- (3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.
- (4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).

(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.

(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).

(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.

Some damage to installations.

(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantaramo City.

(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.

(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- naphthalene.

(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).

b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.

c. Commence large scale United States military operations.

3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.

The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, or the beach.

6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.

7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will begin transmitting on the international distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio

stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to "sell" the incident.

9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead / FB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.

b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.

c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.

ENCLOSURE B

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated* that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt intervention.

2. The need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 March 1962, as follows:

" - - - determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United States to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for positive US military action."

3. It is understood that the Department of State also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

* JCS 1969/303

** JCS 1969/313

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

SM-243-62
1 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Subject: Procedures to be Followed in Handling
Central Intelligence Agency, State
Department and US Information Agency
Requests for DOD Support in Connection
with the Activities of the Caribbean
Survey Group (CSG) (S)

The Department of Defense has been requested to be prepared to assist the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State and the US Information Agency in activities connected with the operations of the Caribbean Survey Group. The enclosure sets forth the procedures to be followed by the Services in handling such requests for support.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

F. J. BLOVIN
RAdm, USN
Secretary

Enclosure:
Subj as above

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CSG-WG 6474

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

SM-242-62
1 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US AIR FORCE

Subject: Procedures to be Followed in Handling
Central Intelligence Agency, State
Department and US Information Agency
Requests for DOD Support in Connection
with the Activities of the Caribbean
Survey Group (CSG) (S)

The Department of Defense has been requested to be prepared to assist the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State and the US Information Agency in activities connected with the operations of the Caribbean Survey Group. The enclosure sets forth the procedures to be followed by the Services in handling such requests for support.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

21 May 62

F. J. BLOUIN
RAdm, USN
Secretary

Enclosure:
Subj as above

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CSG WG-047

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

SM-241-62
1 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Subject: Procedures to be Followed in Handling
Central Intelligence Agency, State
Department and US Information Agency
Requests for DOD Support in Connection
with the Activities of the Caribbean
Survey Group (CSG) (S)

The Department of Defense has been requested to be prepared to assist the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State and the US Information Agency in activities connected with the operations of the Caribbean Survey Group. The enclosure sets forth the procedures to be followed by the Services in handling such requests for support.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

F. J. BLOVIN
RAdm, USN
Secretary

Enclosure:
Subj as above

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CSG-600-44

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

SM-240-62
1 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY

Subject: Procedures to be Followed in Handling
Central Intelligence Agency, State
Department and US Information Agency
Requests for DOD Support in Connection
with the Activities of the Caribbean
Survey Group (CSG) (S)

The Department of Defense has been requested to be prepared to assist the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State and the US Information Agency in activities connected with the operations of the Caribbean Survey Group. The enclosure sets forth the procedures to be followed by the Services in handling such requests for support.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

H. May 84

F. J. BLOUIN
RAdm, USN
Secretary

Enclosure:
Subj as above

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1 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT

**Subject: Procedures for DOD Support of the Operations
of CIA, the State Department, and the USIA**

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Gilpatric have
approved the attached paper, which is forwarded for
your information.

WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brig General, USA
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
21 May 84
OR 17 5/8 1984

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DOD DIR 5200.10



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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

28 Feb 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DOD/JCS REPRESENTATIVE
Caribbean Survey Group

Subject: Cuba Project

The attached procedures are approved for forwarding to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, as the DOD position with respect to support of the CIA, the State Department, and USIA activities connected with the Caribbean Survey Group.

Enclosure:
DOD Procedures

Harold G. Spector

H. May 84

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ENCLOSURE

PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN HANDLING CIA, STATE DEPARTMENT AND
USIA REQUESTS FOR DOD SUPPORT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP (CSG) (S)

1. When approved by the Secretary of Defense the DOD will support fully on a high priority basis requests for support received in writing from the CIA, the State Department, and the US Information Agency in connection with the activities of the CSG.

2. CIA, State Department and the US Information Agency should submit requests for DOD support to the Secretary of Defense (Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)). These requests should contain sufficient information of the overall plan or project to permit a determination of the equipment best suited for accomplishment of the mission and should include a code word to indicate the requested assistance is in support of this project.

3. Upon receipt of such a request in writing the following procedures will apply:

a. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) will forward the request to the DOD/JCS Representative of the CSG.

b. The DOD/JCS Representative will consult with the Services and then secure the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He will then return the request with recommended action to the Secretary of Defense for decision. The Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be advised of the decision.

4. CIA, State Department and the US Information Agency requests for DOD support involving significant numbers of military personnel, amounts of equipment, or equipment in short supply will require the approval of the Secretary of Defense prior to the furnishing of such assistance.

5. Military personnel and/or equipment requested by the CIA, the Department of State and the US Information Agency from the DOD will be retained under the control of the DOD when feasible and consistent with the accomplishment of the mission.

6. As determined by the Secretary of Defense DOD agencies will be reimbursed for support rendered CIA, the Department of State and the US Information Agency in accordance with existing procedures. Otherwise, such support will be provided within the resources available to the DOD. Determination of reimbursement will not in any way delay the implementation of the support requested.

7. Advance security planning will be made a part of all projects that provide support to the CIA, the Department of State and the US Information Agency. This advance security planning will be in conformance with the provisions of DOD Directive 5200.1, dated 8 July 1957.

8. In the event the Services receive requests for support direct from the CIA, the State Department and the US Information Agency, which involve significant numbers of military personnel, amounts of military equipment, or equipment in short supply, they will inform the DOD/JCS Representative of such requests.

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON JCS 1969/311


A Note by the Secretaries

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 20 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 1 of JCS 1969/311 as amended by changes in paragraphs 1, 3b, 4 and 6 of Appendix 1 to Enclosure 1.
2. At their meeting on 23 February 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconsidered JCS 1969/311 and approved the recommendations in paragraph 1, amended as indicated above, and as further amended by changes to paragraph 2 and subparagraph 3b of Appendix 1 to Enclosure C.
3. The memorandum in Enclosure C was forwarded as JCSM-158-62, dated 28 February 1962, to the Secretary of Defense. The memorandum in Enclosure B was forwarded to: Chief of Staff, US Army by SM-240-62; Chief of Naval Operations by SM-241-62; Chief of Staff, US Air Force by SM-242-62; and Commandant of the Marine Corps by SM-243-62. All SM's were dated 1 March 1962.
4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.
5. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/311.



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20 February 1962

Page 2152

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for
consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

* Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat

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REPORT BY THE DOD/JCS REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN HANDLING CIA, STATE
DEPARTMENT AND US INFORMATION AGENCY REQUESTS FOR
DOD SUPPORT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP (S)

1. The DOD/JCS Representative of the Caribbean Survey Group 1
recommends that the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 2
 - a. Note the contents of Enclosure A and Enclosure B. 3
 - b. Approve and forward Enclosure C, with Appendices, to 4
the Secretary of Defense. 5
 - c. After approval of the proposed procedures (Appendix 1 6
to Enclosure C) by the Secretary of Defense, transmit 7
Enclosure D to the Chief of Staff, US Army, Chief of Naval 8
Operations, Chief of Staff, US Air Force and the Commandant 9
of the Marine Corps. 10

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Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff -
20 February 1962

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ENCLOSURE A

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Procedure to be Followed in Handling Central Intelligence Agency, State Department and US Information Agency Requests for DOD Support in Connection with the Activities of the Caribbean Survey Group

1. The attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense recommends procedures to be followed for DOD support of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State Department and US Information Agency (USIA) in connection with the activities of the Caribbean Survey Group. Past experience indicates the need for such procedures.

2. The recommended procedures are based upon the results of a conference held with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 30 January 1962 by the DOD/JCS Representative on the CSG.

3. The procedures recommended to the Secretary of Defense will afford full DOD support to the operations of the CIA, the State Department and USIA in connection with the activities of the CSG. At the same time, from the over-all point of view of the US Government, it will protect the best interests of the DOD.

4. The procedures provide for the submission in writing of requests for DOD support by the CIA, the State Department and USIA to the Secretary of Defense, who will in turn refer the requests to the DOD/JCS Representative on the CSG for evaluation. The DOD/JCS Representative will secure the comments and recommendations of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then forward the request with recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for decision.

WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brig General, USA
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group

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Enclosure A

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ENCLOSURE B

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Guidance from the Deputy Secretary of Defense and his Reaction to Original Proposed Policy for CIA Support by the Department of Defense of Caribbean Survey Group (30 January 1962)

Mr. Gilpatric did not like this paper at all. He indicated the paper was too negative and restricted as though a policy towards an enemy like we are dealing with the Germans or Italians, not a fellow department of our Government. This is a red line operation with the blessing of the President and approved by him as a most important task. This is probably the most important mission we have in the government today. When a request comes in from CIA, you (Craig) will evaluate it and request the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their evaluation and recommendations. The Secretary of Defense will determine, after considering the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what the decision will be, not the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This decision is the prerogative of the Secretary of Defense.

We do not want to get involved in a case-by-case basis. We do not want individual actions on each case. We do not want masses of individual actions. This is a red line priority problem and must be handled with dispatch and without getting involved in minutia regarding expenses and reimbursement or other details. Department of Defense may have to do it themselves regardless who foots the bill. In some cases, CIA will be required to reimburse if so determined by the Secretary of Defense. This is a matter which must be decided by the Secretary of Defense - not the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of Defense budgets for some CIA support. We have equipment of some types lying around not being used and should not require reimbursement for this type, as a general rule. This must be decided by the Secretary of Defense after considering an evaluation by the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Enclosure B

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There are some assets ~~we can~~ without and should make these types available to the CIA without necessarily being reimbursed for it. Mr. Gilpatric does not object to the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending to the Secretary of Defense what equipment should be used for accomplishment of stated mission and specific projects. I explained to Mr. Gilpatric that we were not trying to obstruct the operation, that we read our message loud and clear. I showed him Mr. Bob Kennedy's instructions concerning which he stated: "I can't add anything to that."

I discussed my meeting with Mr. McNamara of last Saturday with Mr. Gilpatric. He indicated that Mr. McNamara had been preoccupied on the Hill and had not known of latest developments on this project, that he would inform him in regard to Mr. McNamara's apprehensions as expressed to me last Saturday concerning security, numbers in the Department of Defense who knew of the project, etc. Mr. Gilpatric said I could inform the people necessary regarding the project in order to get the job done. This was up to my judgment. Mr. Gilpatric made it clear that I was the DOD Representative and he wanted me to make recommendations concerning requests for CIA support.

I emphasized the urgent requirement that the Services and Chiefs should determine the proper personnel and equipment to be used for specific tasks since they were better qualified as to capability and limitation of their equipment and personnel than the CIA.

In summary, Mr. Gilpatric recognized the need for the establishment of a policy on this subject. He was most emphatic that the decision as to whether or not a request was approved was the prerogative of the Secretary of Defense NOT the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the Secretary of Defense would like to have evaluations and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of

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Enclosure B

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Staff available for consideration in making important decisions on the subject. He considered the approach used in our original recommendations much too negative and directed me to adopt a more positive approach in a new proposal.

WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brig. General, USA
DOD/JCS Representative,
Caribbean Survey Group

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Enclosure B

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DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Procedures to be Followed in Handling CIA,
State Department, and USIA Requests for
DOD Support in Connection with the
Activities of the Caribbean Survey Group.

1. Reference is made to the memorandum for Brigadier General William H. Craig, USA, from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, subject: "Special Projects", dated 17 January 1962.
2. The referenced memorandum states:
"b. Department of Defense must be prepared to assist fully Central Intelligence Agency and Department of State in * * * operations as Defense commitments of men, money, and materials are required."
and invited formal recommendations concerning the Defense role and contributions.
3. Enclosure 1 recommends procedures for DOD support of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the US Information Agency in connection with the activities of the Caribbean Survey Group (CSG).
4. Enclosure 2 is a draft of a recommended memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Director, Central Intelligence, and the US Information Agency setting forth procedures governing DOD support of the operations of the CSG.
5. Issuance of the recommended memoranda should assure that the procedures governing DOD support of the operations of the CSG are followed.

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Enclosure C

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ENCLOSURE B

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Director, United States Information Agency

Subject: Procedures to be Followed in Handling
Requests for DOD Support in Connection with
the Activities of the Caribbean Survey Group

1. Reference is made to the activities of the Caribbean Survey Group (CSG).
2. Requests for DOD support in connection with the activities of the CSG should be submitted in writing to the Secretary of Defense (Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)). In order to facilitate and expedite the furnishing of such support, each request should contain sufficient information of the overall plan or project to permit a determination of the personnel and/or equipment best suited for accomplishment of the mission and an agreed code word to indicate that the requested assistance is in support of this project.
3. In regard to the funding of the operations, it is desired that, as determined by the Secretary of Defense, DOD agencies be reimbursed for support rendered in accordance with existing procedures. Determination of reimbursement will not in any way delay the implementation of the support requested. In the event agreement cannot be reached quickly on the funding, I propose that the funding problem be resolved at a later date.
4. I trust that the above meets with your approval and that you will inform me accordingly.

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ENCLOSURE D

SPECIAL HANDLING

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subject: Procedures to be Followed in Handling Central Intelligence Agency, State Department and US Information Agency Requests for DOD Support in Connection with the Activities of the Caribbean Survey Group (CSG)

The Department of Defense has been requested to be prepared to assist the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of State, and the US Information Agency in activities connected with the operations of the Caribbean Survey Group. The enclosure sets forth the procedures to be followed by the Services in handling such requests for support.

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Enclosure D

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ENCLOSURE A

PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN HANDLING CIA, STATE DEPARTMENT, USIA REQUESTS FOR DOD SUPPORT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP (CSG) (S)

1. When approved by the Secretary of Defense the DOD will support fully on a high priority basis requests for support received in writing from the CIA, the State Department, and the US Information Agency in connection with the activities of the CSG.

2. CIA, State Department and the US Information Agency should submit requests for DOD support to the Secretary of Defense (Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)). These requests should contain sufficient information of the overall plan or project to permit a determination of the equipment best suited for accomplishment of the mission and should include a code word to indicate the requested assistance is in support of this project.

3. Upon receipt of such a request in writing the following procedures will apply:

a. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) will forward the request to the DOD/JCS Representative of the CSG.

b. The DOD/JCS Representative will consult with the Services and then secure the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He will then return the request with recommended action to the Secretary of Defense for decision. The Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be advised of the decision.

4. CIA, State Department and the US Information Agency requests for DOD support involving significant numbers of military personnel, amounts of equipment, or equipment in short supply will require the approval of the Secretary of Defense prior to the furnishing of such assistance.

Enclosure A

(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 & 23 Feb

5. Military personnel and/or equipment requested by the CIA, the Department of State and the US Information Agency from the DOD will be retained under the control of the DOD when feasible and consistent with the accomplishment of the mission.

6. As determined by the Secretary of Defense DOD agencies will be reimbursed for support rendered CIA, the Department of State and the US Information Agency in accordance with existing procedures. Otherwise, such support will be provided within the resources available to the DOD. Determination of reimbursement will not in any way delay the implementation of the support requested.

7. Advance security planning will be made a part of all projects that provide support to the CIA, the Department of State and the US Information Agency. This advance security planning will be in conformance with the provisions of DOD Directive 5200.1, dated 8 Jul 1957.

8. In the event the Services receive requests for support direct from the CIA, the State Department and the US Information Agency, which involve significant numbers of military personnel, amounts of military equipment, or equipment in short supply, they will inform the DOD/JCS Representative of such requests.

Enclosure A

(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 20 & 23 Feb 62)

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

HOLDERS OF JCS 1969/311

A Note by the Secretaries

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

Holders are requested to substitute the attached revised Decision On and to destroy the superseded Decision On in accordance with security regulations.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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2nd N/H of JCS 1969/311

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7 February 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/303
(NORTHWOODS) (S)

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 22 May 64
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

At their meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD Representative to the Caribbean Survey Group as set forth in paragraph 13 of the subject paper, as amended by changing the second paragraph of Enclosure A so as to read:

"2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the attached proposal be adopted as the official DOD position and forwarded to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project."

It was also agreed that General Craig should convey to the Deputy Secretary of Defense the Joint Chiefs' position that General Craig should be the JCS Representative as well as the DOD Representative to the Caribbean Survey Group. It was further agreed that, in regard to clearances for NORTHWOODS, the access list would be extended to include the four Service Intelligence Chiefs, the Deputy Commander of TAC, the Deputy Commander of CONARC, and the Commander of the 18th Airborne Corps. ADM WELLINGS SAYS THIS WASN'T INCLUDED

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

M. J. Ingelido
M. J. INGELIDO
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Secretary

Copy to:

General Craig ✓

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SECRET

7 February 1962

Decision on:

JCS 1969/303
(NORTHWOODS) (S)

At their meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved BGEN Craig's recommendations as set forth in paragraph 13 of the subject paper, as amended by changes in the second paragraph of Enclosure A.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON *22 May 84*
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

M. J. Ingelido
M. J. INGELIDO
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Secretary

Copy to:

General Craig

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8 February 1962

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DECISION OF JCS 1969/303
A Note by the Secretaries
on

NORTHWOODS (S)

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 13 of JCS 1969/303 as amended by changes in the second paragraph of Enclosure A.

2. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1969/303.

F. J. BLOVIN


M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 20 May 84
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REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP TO THE CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

01

CUBAN PROJECT

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POSITION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CUBA PROJECT

THE PROBLEM

1. As requested by the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project* to determine a firm US position regarding the stake and role of the Department of Defense in the event US assistance is requested in support of Cuban insurgent efforts to overthrow the Castro government.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. National Security Policy concerning overthrow of the Castro regime is as agreed at the 9 May 1961 meeting of the National Security Council.**

2. The situation in Cuba will be as reflected in current National Intelligence Estimates.***

3. Operations against the Castro government will be covert in the initial stages.

4. Time favors the Castro government.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. At the 5 May 1961 meeting** of the National Security Council it was agreed that US policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro. Other significant elements of policy determined at that meeting were:

a. The United States should not undertake military intervention in Cuba at that time but should do nothing to foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the future.

b. The United States should not impose a naval blockade or attempt an air war against Cuba.

* Memorandum from Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale, USAF, for Brigadier General W. H. Craig, USA, subject: "Special Project" dated 17 Jan 1962, not on file in Joint Secretariat

** Enclosure to JCS 2304/16

*** SNIE 85-61, dated 28 Nov 61, also NIE 85-62 to be published 7 Feb 1962, both documents will be available through Joint Secretariat

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- c. The direction of the President that the Central Intelligence Agency, with other departments, should make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba, was noted.
7. For additional facts, see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

8. For discussion, see Enclosure C.

CONCLUSIONS

9. The basic military implications of Castro's Communist government are as follows:

- a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly serious threat to its security. This increases our national vulnerability and defense costs as forces are developed or shifted to meet this threat.
- b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the possibility that additional Latin American countries will come under Communist control. Elimination of this base would demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the United States will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist control of additional countries would or could result in:

- (1) Increased Communist capability for attack on other nations of the Western Hemisphere;
- (2) Increased Communist capability for spreading Communism throughout Latin America;
- (3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources of strategic materials necessary to our military capability;

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(4) An increased threat to US usage and control of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage.

10. The urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the hemisphere. This sense of urgency is greatly increased if courses of action within the capability of the Communists are considered:

a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air bases in Cuba.

b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, or they could furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the nuclear warheads.

11. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of ousting the Communist regime and installing a government acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of Communist Bloc reactions in areas other than Cuba is recognized, it is believed that the project objective can be accomplished without precipitating general war, and without serious effect on world public opinion if the following four conditions prevail:

a. If the impression is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the United States is responding to an appeal for assistance from a government representative of the Cuban people.

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b. If it is announced prior to the overt military action that the United States and/or other members of the OAS are moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding free elections, and that they will immediately withdraw as soon as the new government advises that they have the capability to maintain order without further assistance from OAS nations.

c. If the military operation is conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Block's ability to take effective counter-measures in support of the Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.

d. Or, if the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt US interventions. In this event, applicable portions of a, b, and c above apply.

12. The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA and State, or through these agencies, to any US approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel and bases.

RECOMMENDATIONS

13. It is recommended that:

a. The memorandum at Inclosure A hereto, which reflects the above conclusions, be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

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ENCLOSURE A

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cuba

1. Pursuant to the objectives of the Caribbean Survey Group, the Department of Defense was requested* to construct a firm position with respect to the Department's stake and role in the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the attached proposal be adopted as the official DOD position and forwarded to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.

*Memorandum from BrigGeneral E. G. Lansdale, USAF, for BrigGeneral W.H. Craig, USA, subject: "Special Project", dated 17 Jan 1962; not on file in Joint Secretariat

As amended by JCS at meeting on 7 February 1962

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APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL E. G. LANSDALE,
Chief of Operations, Cuba Project

Subject: Cuba Project

Reference: Memorandum from Your Office for
BrigGen W. I. Craig, USA, subj:
"Special Project", dated 17 Jan 62

1. As requested in referenced memorandum, the position of the Department of Defense, with respect to the military stake and role in the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba, has been determined based upon the following factors:

a. National Security Policy, determined by the NSC during the meeting of 9 May 1961.

b. Current intelligence estimates of the situation in Cuba.

c. Operations against the Castro regime will be covert, at least initially.

d. Time favors the Castro government.

2. The basic military implications of Castro's Communist government are as follows:

a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly serious threat to its security. This increases our national vulnerability and defense costs as forces are developed or shifted to meet this threat.

b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the possibility that additional Latin American countries will come under Communist control. Elimination of this base would demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the United States will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist control of additional countries would or could result in:

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(1) Increased Communist capability for attack on other nations of the Western Hemisphere.

(2) Increased Communist capability for spreading Communism throughout Latin America.

(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources of strategic materials necessary to our military capability.

(4) An increased threat to US usage and control of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage.

3. The urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the hemisphere. This sense of urgency is greatly increased if courses of action within the capability of the Communists are considered:

a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air bases in Cuba.

b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads; or they could furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the nuclear warheads.

4. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of ousting the Communist regime and installing a government acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of Communist Bloc reactions in areas other than in Cuba is recognized, it is believed that this can be accomplished without precipitating general war, and without serious effect on world public opinion if the following conditions prevail:

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a. If the impression is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the United States is responding to an appeal for assistance from a government representative of the Cuban people.

b. If it is announced incident to the overt military action that the United States and/or members of the OAS are moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding free elections, and that they will immediately withdraw as soon as the new government advises that they have the capability to maintain order without further assistance from the OAS nations.

c. If the military operation is conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures in support of the Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.

d. Or, if the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt US intervention. In this event, applicable portions of a, b, and c above apply.

5. The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA or State, or any US approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel and bases.

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FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The over-all plan* for the overthrow of the Castro government is responsive to the following objective:

"The US objective is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace."

2. It is becoming increasingly evident that the Castro regime, aided materially, morally and financially by the Sino-Soviet Bloc, has become firmly entrenched. Over the past two and one-half years, the Castro regime has gradually built up a police state on the Sino-Soviet model. The first step was the immediate replacement of the existing Cuban Army and police force by revolutionary units which had fought with Castro during the revolution in the hills and in the underground. Changes in the Navy and Air Force were accomplished through purges of top personnel. Toward the end of 1959 as disillusionment and opposition over the drift toward closer association with the Sino-Soviet Bloc began to crystalize within the regular armed forces, the regime again shifted its basis of power, this time to the newly-formed civilian worker-peasant-student militia. Dr. Castro looked upon this militia as a presumably more reliable military force. For almost a year the militia maintained its status as a para-military organization under labor union and student federation leadership. On 29 September 1960, Castro reorganized the militia along military lines and the chief of the corresponding military district took over command of the militia units. Specifically trained officers replaced the original militia commanders and military training was accelerated.

* Program Review by Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale, USAF, subject: "The Cuba Project", dated 18 Jan 1962; not on file in the Joint Secretariat.

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3. Simultaneously, the Castro regime was also building its security network*. In June 1961, the process culminated with the establishment of a Ministry of Interior with responsibility for maintaining "public order". The decree centralizes the various police and investigation units under the new ministry. It also gave the Ministry authority to supervise the activities of "Committees for the Defense of the Revolution". These committees are responsible for informing authorities of "counter-revolutionary" activities or attitudes. A campaign is under way to establish 100,000 of such committees with 50,000 "volunteer" members in offices, factories, schools, churches, cooperatives, residential areas, etc. By centralizing the police function and combining it with a vast network of informers, the Castro regime has established a security system on the Communist Bloc model.

4. In support of this military and security build-up, Castro forces have been equipped with arms and materiel from the Sino-Soviet Bloc countries, i.e., Czechoslovakia and Russia. Information indicates the Cuban force is well equipped with modern weapons and that there is in Cuba an actual surplus of military equipment for the force in being. Some accounts indicate that certain materiel is rather sophisticated, and includes EW radar, fire control systems, advanced fighters, short and possibly medium range rockets. It becomes obvious that the Castro forces are being trained and equipped for operations far beyond that required to maintain law and order and internal security. This represents a continuous threat to the Western Hemisphere, and is a Communist stronghold for the

* Department of State White Paper, subject: "The Castro Regime in Cuba", recently published but undated; not on file in Joint Secretariat

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continued spread of Communism to other countries of the inter-American System.

5. In response to a request* by the President in April 1961 the Defense Department has already planned for the over-throw of the Castro government by use of military force. In the event formal, overt commitment of US forces in Cuba should become necessary there are now two US military plans** in being either of which could be implemented. Both plans provide for the deployment of sizeable US forces and are designed, among other things, toward the over-throw of the Castro-government as rapidly as possible.

a. CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61,** approved*** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides for a simultaneous amphibious and airborne assault within 18 days after the execution order, assuming an prior alert or prepositioning of forces. After the initial assault, it is estimated that overthrow of the Castro government and the gain of essential control of Cuba would be assured in 10 days.

b. CINCLANT OPLAN 316-61,** designed for a faster commitment of US forces, provides for an airborne assault within 5 days of the execution order. However, since this plan deploys fewer forces initially, no estimate is made concerning the length of time required for overthrow of the government or control of Cuba. This latter plan, not yet approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is in process of minor revision by CINCLANT.

* JCS 2304/29

** CINCLANT Contingency Operations Plan 314-61 (Cuba), and CINCLANT Contingency Operations Plan 316-61 (Cuba), both plans on file in Joint Secretariat

*** JCS 2018/306

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ENCLOSURE C

DISCUSSION

1. Although it is possible that a Cuban counter-revolutionary leader could emerge with sufficient appeal to enable the anti-Castro elements to unite in an attempt to seize power, such eventuality does not seem likely unless fostered and supported by the United States. To date, exiled Cubans have failed to produce such a leader.* Even the loss of Castro by assassination or by natural causes, while unsettling on the government, would almost certainly not prove fatal to the regime.** It is therefore expected that no Cuban leader or insurgent group can independently undertake a significant subversion effort against the government with any reasonable chance of success.

2. Even a cursory look at Castro's military preparations to defend Cuba indicates that a purely overt attempt to overthrow the Castro government can only be accomplished by a well conceived military plan in significant force, requiring military intervention by the United States.

3. As long as Cuba does not become a member and an accepted military partner of the Warsaw Pact the threat of general war as a result of US military intervention in Cuba does not appear to exist.

4. It is expected that the Castro government will avoid giving the United States sufficient provocation for armed intervention. For this reason Cuban forces are not expected to be committed to an attack on the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. Neither is it

* J-2 DM-400-61, "After the Assassination of Castro 'What?'" dated 27 October 1961; on file in J-2

** SNIE 85-61, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba", dated 28 Nov 61; on file in Joint Secretariat

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expected that Castro will allow a definite relationship to become known or apparent between his government and communist attempts at infiltration and subversion of other Latin American states.

5. It is postulated therefore, that to progress in following the established national policy of aiming at the downfall of Castro, it will be necessary for the United States to support a selected Cuban insurgent attempt from the outset and to be prepared to sustain such insurgent program to a successful conclusion, including overt military intervention as the final and decisive step.

6. It is clear that the United States cannot afford repetition of the unfortunate miscalculation of the political aspirations of Fidel Castro in the desire to see an end to the Batista regime. It would appear that a significant lesson of this costly mistake is the requirement for emphasis and improvement in US intelligence efforts to evaluate the true colors of potentially capable personalities and groups which eventually may have to be recognized and supported by the United States in future counter-revolutionary undertakings.

7. The basic military implications of Castro's Communist government are as follows:

a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly serious threat to its security. This increases our national vulnerability and defense costs as forces are developed or shifted to meet this threat.

b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the possibility that additional Latin American countries will come under Communist control. Elimination of this base in Cuba would demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the US will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist control of additional countries would or could result in:

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(1) Increased Communist capability for attack on other nations of the Western Hemisphere.

(2) Increased Communist capability for spreading Communism throughout Latin America.

(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources of strategic materials necessary to our military capability.

(4) An increased threat to US usage and control of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage.

8. The urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the hemisphere. This sense of urgency is greatly increased if courses of action within the capability of the Communists are considered:

a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air bases in Cuba.

b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, or they could furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the nuclear warheads.

9. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of ousting the Communist regime and installing a government acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of Communist Bloc reactions in areas other than in Cuba is recognized, it is believed that this can be accomplished without precipitating general war, and without serious effect on world public opinion if the following conditions prevail:

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a. If the impression is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the United States is responding to an appeal for assistance from a government representative of the Cuban people.

b. If it is announced incident to the overt military action that the United States and/or other members of the OAS are moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding free elections, and that they will immediately withdraw as soon as the new government advises that they have the capability to maintain order without further assistance from OAS nations.

c. If the military operation is conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures in support of the Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.

d. Or, if the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt US intervention. In this event, applicable portions of a, b, and c above apply.

10. The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA, or through these agencies, to any US approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel and bases.

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